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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies how transfer pricing policies are applied. Working for a small 
multinational enterprise, I discovered how transfer pricing is fundamental when dealing with 
intra-group transactions. That’s the reason why I decided to focus my attention on this topic. 
The aim is therefore based on its practice and on its related facts. Starting from the literature 
review, from the analysis of transfer pricing theories and models, from application methods 
and from the study of the arm’s length principle, I was keen to discover what was the correct 
way of deciding the transfer price in compliance with regulations. As we will find out, 
transfer pricing is not a scientific rule but it relates to the type of business that the company 
makes, to the type of market in which the company operates and to the type of transaction that 
is made. This means that in order to select the correct transfer price and the correct model to 
be applied, it is necessary for the management to make specific assumptions and specific 
analysis in order to determine the correct transfer pricing method in compliance with OECD 
regulations and in compliance with the company’s strategy. One of the first things to be 
analyzed when companies are audited is the arm’s length principle together with comparable 
transaction. These will be adequately examined in the following pages because they are 
fundamental in order to avoid problems. To mitigate risks, it is recommended that every 
company have a good transfer pricing documentation or enter APA programs to avoid 
penalties and fines. Transfer pricing is not only related to profit shifting activities, but as we 
will see, it is also used as strategic support for companies that want to penetrate markets or 
gain new markets shares. It is a tremendously complex issue since it regards and involves so 
many different dimensions. Guidelines provide tools for companies to develop their transfer 
pricing strategy, but they can rarely use models and methods provided straight off. They need 
to evaluate their situation and in most cases modifications are necessary to adjust the model to 
suit them. Theory, as we will see, is only a framework that can help explain the consequences 
of different features and choices in the development of strategic transfer pricing. 
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Chapter 1  
 
1. Introduction 
 
“The issue of transfer pricing arise when large entities develop separate divisions within the 
organization in order to achieve benefits from decentralization in decision making. These 
divisions or units are in most cases practically independent profit centers and they often 
transfer and sell goods and services between one another. These transfers are referred to as 
transfer pricing.”1 
Transfer pricing has been around for the past 100 years, and the first draft of OECD 
Guidelines was issued only in 1995. In addition, it is only within the past 10-15 years, that 
transfer pricing has generated as much awareness as it has today. It has caught the attention of 
many local governments after the financial crisis. One of the main areas on which the focus is 
put is the remuneration related to inter-company financing and inter-company loans. The 
business environment has changed leaning towards larger organizations creating and 
increasing the number of transactions that happens in the world. The share of transactions that 
happen between related parties are estimated to be between 60% and 80% of all transactions. 
These changes are reflected on the international trade, and multinationals are having a greater 
effect on the local tax base than before. In addition to this, the scope of transactions involves 
more complicated products and services, which can be difficult to price. They may refer to a 
normal transfer of goods over to today’s intercompany transactions, which can involve 
specific knowledge, IP, financial instruments, management services etc. As we know, in the 
current global situation, tax authorities are under heavy political pressure; governments are 
always searching to reduce tax evasion, so in order to do it more transfer pricing adjustments 
are made to test the local legislations and ensure that companies are not using transfer pricing 
as a mean to avoid taxation. So as mentioned before, one of the important areas on which 
there is an increased focus is transfer pricing related to financial transactions, for example 
intercompany financing. Tax authorities are challenging the pricing of these transactions and 
also testing the economical reason behind them in order to secure the local tax base. This has 
put the principles in the OECD Guidelines to the test and companies are always trying their 
best in order to be more efficient and compliant with regulations.  
                                                          
1
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 “International transfer pricing is the pricing of goods, services or intangibles that are 
transferred between members of the same group that cross national boundaries”2 
This is something all multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been aware of and one positive 
thing with the transfer pricing laws is that many countries are using similar approaches. 
(Abdallah 2004). The transfer pricing requirements in most international laws are based and 
built on the guidelines that are published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD). It is a forum where governments seek solutions for economical, 
social and environmental problems; it is formed by 34 countries and was created in 1948 to 
administer the Marshal Aid provided by the USA and Canada after the Second World War. 
Today it aims to improve policies and implement soft law which are not binding laws but 
could lead to international treaties or support local law becoming then binding law. (Tvarno & 
Nielsen, 2008). It has developed The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations. They are accepted as a framework and are used to 
analyze the Arm’s length prices and conditions, as well as solve international tax issues. 
Therefore it provides guidance on the application of the arm's length principle that could be 
easily summarized with the following statement.  
“Transactions within a multinational group should reflect the conditions that would occur 
between independent enterprises (E&Y 2009).” 
The price of transactions between members of a MNE can have a huge impact on which part 
of the group profits are registered, especially in relation to the country in which the tax is 
payable. An effective transfer pricing strategy affects all parts of an organization; not just 
prices of goods and services but also intangible fixed assets and financial transactions. (SKV 
607 2007). For a MNE’s transfer pricing policy that is very important not only for tax 
purposes but also to achieve profit maximization and sustainable growth. There are different 
goals of establishing a transfer pricing policy such as: reduction of income taxes, reduction of 
tariffs, minimization of foreign exchange risk, avoidance of conflicts with host countries’ 
governments, management of cash-flows, competitiveness, performance evaluations, 
motivation and global harmonization. (Abdallah 2004). 
 
                                                          
2
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The OECD standard has done a great job in contributing to a uniform global standard even 
though there are domestic considerations and peculiarities to manage. These are of course 
superior when dealing with non-member countries. (Mahalingham 2009). There are also other 
factors than laws and regulations, which can affect the transfer pricing strategies; the business 
environment differs among countries and there are cultural aspects and principles that can 
affect them. (Ho 2009). The principles for building a transfer pricing strategy within a 
business group often have their basis in the domestic taxation law, but also in other external 
environmental factors such as for example customs duty rates and other regulations. Above 
this, there are also political issues, social-behavioral concerns and internal environmental 
factors that can affect the principles. These factors can appear completely different in 
different countries and might lead to conflicts within the group. (Ho 2009) 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
As we were saying before, there are many variables that could affect the decision on how to 
build a transfer pricing policy, and that could affect the result of such policy. Analyzing the 
literature, we find different results in relation to the country that has been examined. Tang and 
Chan (1979) focus on the environmental variables considered by US and Japanese MNEs in 
building their transfer pricing policies. They also identify the environmental variables that 
discriminate between US and Japanese MNEs on international transfer pricing practices. 
Analyzing the results, they found that these are the most relevant variables for US firms: 
  profit to the company; 
  restrictions on profit remittances imposed by host countries; 
  competitive position of foreign subsidiaries; 
  differentials in income tax rates and income tax legislation among countries ; 
 performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries  
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Japanese firms most relevant variables are instead the following: 
 profit to the company; 
 competitive position of foreign subsidiaries; 
 devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies; 
  restrictions on repatriation of profits imposed by foreign countries; 
 performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries; 
They find that interest of local partners, devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies, 
anti-dumping legislation, import restrictions imposed by foreign countries and differentials in 
income tax rates and income tax legislation among countries contribute the most to the 
different perceptions between the rating of US and Japanese firms. Tang (1981) also analyze 
the similarities and differences between groups of MNEs (the US, Japan, Canada, and the 
UK) in their consideration of environmental variables for transfer pricing decisions. His 
results show that the four national groups consider profits to the company and competitive 
position of subsidiaries in foreign countries the most important variables. UK and Japanese 
companies rank the interest of local partners in foreign subsidiaries higher than Canadian and 
US companies. Compared with the other national groups, Japanese companies give more 
importance on the devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies. Tang (1993) finds that 
overall profit to the company is still the most important environmental variable for US MNE’s 
transfer pricing decisions. Compared with Tang (1979), management ranked differentials in 
income tax rates and income tax legislation among countries, maintaining good relationships 
with host governments, the need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to seek local funds, and 
antitrust legislation of foreign countries as more important to transfer pricing decisions. In 
Tang’s study (2002) there is an update showing that for transfer pricing, tax regulations in the 
United States has become the most important variable for transfer pricing decisions, followed 
by the overall profit to the company. In Burns (1980), the aim of the study is to find the extent 
to which firms’ transfer pricing decisions are influenced by various environmental factors. He 
analyzes the responses from financial executives of 62 US-based MNEs. They were asked to 
rate the importance of each environmental variable on their firms’ transfer pricing decisions 
and to select five environmental variables which are the most important to their firms’ transfer 
pricing decisions. 
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 These were the results that emerged from the investigation:  
 market conditions in foreign countries; 
 competition in foreign countries; 
 reasonable profit for foreign affiliates; 
 US federal income taxes 
 economic conditions in foreign countries  
 
Mostafa et al. (1984) studied the phenomenon using a discriminant analysis to test whether 
the environmental variables, including the overall profit of the company, divisional autonomy, 
and compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations, would affect the choice of transfer 
pricing methods by MNEs. After an analysis through 46 UK companies using a questionnaire 
survey the results showed that the perceived importance of the variables, including the overall 
profit of the company, divisional autonomy, compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations 
and performance evaluation of divisions, are significantly related to the international transfer 
pricing methods used, thus confirming prior studies. Borkowski (1992) studied the 
organizational and environmental variables affecting transfer pricing decision thanks to a 
questionnaire submitted to 247 US-based MNEs. Results showed that the choice of a transfer 
pricing method is affected by specific organizational and environmental characteristics such 
as the ease and cost of implementation, the use of subsidiary profit as the primary 
performance evaluation measure, the degree of decentralization in the MNE, the tax and tariff 
regulations and the economic stability of the host MNE country. In a subsequent study, 
Borkowski (1997a) tries to determine whether organizational factors, environmental factors, 
and financial factors affect the choice of transfer pricing methods using univariate tests. A 
questionnaire survey was submitted to 39 Japanese MNEs and 28 US MNEs. Results show 
that Japanese and US MNEs utilize different transfer pricing methods with Japanese MNEs 
more likely to use non-cost-based methods than the US MNEs. Findings also highlight that 
the choice of transfer pricing methods is affected by differences in environmental (including 
the risk of audits by tax authorities and the market conditions in subsidiary countries) and 
financial factors (including return on equity and return on assets), but not by organizational 
factors (including industry and performance evaluation criteria). Environmental variables 
have a significant impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods. Borkowski (1997b) 
analyzes the importance of environmental factors on transfer pricing decisions using similar 
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statistical methods as Borkowski (1997a). Her sample included 28 Canadian MNEs with US 
subsidiaries and 62 US MNEs with Canadian subsidiaries. Canadian and US MNEs have 
similar views on the importance of different environmental variables on transfer pricing 
decisions, and “economic conditions of Canada” and “risk of audits by US tax authorities” are 
significant factors affecting the choice of transfer pricing methods. Klassen et al. (1993) 
evaluated changes in the reporting of taxable income by US MNEs in response to the changes 
in income tax rates. They analyzed accounting data from 191 US MNEs and found evidence 
of income shifting related to tax rate changes in Canada, Europe and the US. Results show 
that with increasing Canadian tax rates, MNEs shift income to the United States from Canada, 
whereas with decreasing rates in Europe, they shift income to Europe from the United States. 
Cravens and Shearon (1996) tried to understand if transfer pricing policies had an impact on 
financial consequences through a questionnaire survey of US MNEs. They found that the 
number of countries of operation and the dollar value of transfers are important factors that 
explain the total tax burden of MNEs. They also found that the value of transfers and the 
foreign sales percentage have an effect on the financial outcomes of the firm as measured by 
the return of assets. Jacob (1996) studied the relationships between intrafirm sales, differential 
tax rates and tax payments. He collected data from annual reports of US firms from 1982 to 
1984 and from 1988 to 1990. He discovered that firms with an important amount of intrafirm 
transfers paid lower global taxes, lower US taxes in the period of 1982-1984 (i.e. when 
foreign tax rates were lower than US tax rates) and higher US taxes in the period of 1988-
1990 (i.e. when US tax rates were lower than foreign tax rates). This study highlights that 
transfer pricing is an effective policy to adopt when trying to reduce tax payments. Oyelere 
and Emmanuel (1998) worked on the use use of international transfer pricing as a way to shift 
income by foreign-controlled enterprises operating in the UK. They compared the profitability 
and dividend distributions of a sample of 36 foreign-controlled enterprises and 36 UK-
controlled enterprises over a two-year period. They found that foreign-controlled enterprises 
have lower profitability and higher dividend distribution than UK-controlled enterprises. This 
proves that foreign-controlled enterprises in the UK shift income through international 
transfer pricing. Conover and Nichols (2000) evaluated the effect of firm size on income 
shifting between tax jurisdictions using transfer pricing. They expanded the sample of Jacob 
(1996) by including 127 additional observations. By doing so, their study extended prior 
studies including smaller and financially distressed firms in the sample. They found that 
smaller and financially distressed firms are less likely to shift income through transfer pricing 
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than larger firms. Prior studies revealed that transfer price negotiators expect fairness-based 
price concessions that moderate the influence of an outside market price when it strongly 
favors one of the parties. Based on an experimental study, Kachelmeier and Towry (2002) 
examined whether the expectations of fairness-based price concessions extended to the actual 
prices that result from a real-cash negotiation. They found that expectations of fairness-based 
price concessions do not survive actual 20 negotiations when participants negotiate over a 
computer network with no communication other than bids, asks, and acceptances. Conversely, 
both expectations and actual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based price concessions 
when participants negotiate in a face-to-face setting with unrestricted communication. 
In conclusion, as we saw from the results of the studies above mentioned, environmental 
variables are likely to have a significant impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods. 
Differentials in income tax rates, income tax and transfer pricing regulations among countries, 
competition in foreign countries, shifting due to tax rate changes and other tax considerations 
as well as the volume of transfer are actually important environmental variables for transfer 
pricing decisions. Transfer pricing may also be affected by the nature of negotiations. In the 
end, we can observe that transfer pricing is always done in order to make the firm profit from 
either situation of the ones that we just saw. 
 
3. Transfer Pricing Theory and Models 
 
We know that MNEs are formed by different divisions that are practically independent profit 
centers that often transfer and sell services and goods between each other. The prices, as seen 
in the introduction, are called transfer prices and they should be decided according to the 
arm’s length principle, which means that the pricing should be related to external market 
conditions (OECD 2009). Hirshleifer states that prices must be set in order to encourage each 
division to act to maximize the profit of the firm as a whole. This is a highly important issue 
since the prices set on internal transfers affect the activity within divisions, the rate of return 
on investments by which each division is judged and therefore the total profit that is achieved 
by the firm as a whole. Internal and external goals could be determined by the use of transfer 
pricing method/policies. Performance evaluation of subsidiaries, motivating managers, tax 
reduction and strengthening of foreign subsidiaries, reducing foreign exchange risk, 
increasing market shares, profit maximization and tax burden minimization are common goals 
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that could be reached through transfer pricing. (Cuzdriorean and Jurcãu 2009). There is 
always a trade-off between arm’s length prices and profits. For example, when entering a new 
market, low prices might be linked to a strategy of expansion through market shares gains. 
However the strategy has to consider arm’s length prices in order to avoid exposure of tax 
risks. (Przysusky et al. 2005). There are different models for transfer pricing decisions.  
 
Market price model 
“The fundamental principle is that the transfer price should be similar to the price that would be 
charged if the product were sold to outside customers or purchased from outside vendors.”3 
This model is based on an existing competitive external market where an identical or similar 
product or service is traded as on the internal market. It is however important that the market 
is perfectly or highly competitive, otherwise the market price can give a misleading picture, 
resulting in a non-optimal transfer price. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2007, Emmanuel & 
Mehafdi 1994). Using this transfer pricing model based on market prices will guarantee the 
fact that congruent decisions are made without the need of the central administration. 
(Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). Managers in both profit centers will make decisions that 
are optimal from the firm’s perspective and this provides good information for evaluating the 
performance of the different units. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2007). What if companies do 
not buy or sell the product in the market? They can find published market prices that are 
actually paid in a market place, which can be used to decide the transfer price. The outside 
conditions must reflect the conditions within the company in order to give a correct 
comparison. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007, Merchant & Van der Stede 2007). Companies 
could also use quasi market-based transfer prices if the external conditions are different from 
internal ones. Using this type of pricing model allows deviations from the actual market 
prices. Companies have to adjust the market price so that it suits the internal conditions and 
reflects the differences between the internal and external sales. (Merchant & Van der Stede 
2007). This can be done by calculating the cost of the differences in design, quality and other 
conditions between the comparative products. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007, Merchant & 
Van der Stede 2007). The same is valid if production profit centers sell similar products to the 
outside market. If the normal profit is 30% over the standard cost on the products sold to the 
                                                          
3
 Anthony and Govindarajan 2007 p.231 
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outside market, the company can add 30% to the standard cost to find the competitive price to 
the product sold within the company. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). Hirshleifer (1956) 
states that the market price is only the correct transfer price when the transferred product is 
produced in a perfectly competitive market. The problem is that perfectly competitive markets 
are very rare. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2007, Emmanuel & Mehafdi 1994). Imperfectly 
competitive markets force managers to make trade-offs between economically favorable 
solutions at the expense of divisional autonomy, or of a sub-optimal solution that maintains 
divisional autonomy. 
 
Negotiated Price Model 
This model allows negotiation of transfer prices between themselves. This is an effective 
method if both units have the same “bargaining power”. Both parties have the possibilities to 
trade with external companies and therefore are independent from each other. (Merchant & 
Van der Stede 2007). The advantage of this model is that it allows the most competent and 
informed employees, for that specific product or service, to make the price decision (Anthony 
and Govindarajan 2007). There is a danger when using this model, and basically it is related 
to the fact that business units might spend too much time negotiating internal transfer prices 
and lose focus on external sales and prices causing an efficiency problem for the group as a 
whole (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). Other disadvantages can be conflicts within the 
company, causing management to waste time on solving them instead of focusing on tasks 
that are more important. Another problem can be that the two negotiators have different 
bargaining power and skills so that the result depends more on the employees negotiating than 
on the prices of production etc. Competitive employees can also become egoistic and try to 
beat each other instead of acting in the interest of the company. (Merchant & Van der Stede 
2007). These are quite significant cons for this model and from my perspective quite limiting 
for the correct and more efficient outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Cost-based Model 
This model is related to the company’s cost. When analyzing this model we have to pay 
attention to the definition of cost and on how to calculate the profit mark-up. (Anthony and 
Govindarajan 2007). The definition of cost divides this model into two sub-categories: 
Marginal cost and Full-cost
4
. Marginal cost is defined as the total cost for a company to 
produce an additional unit of a product
5
. The transfer price should then be set at the marginal 
cost of the supplying division at the optimal output level (Emmanuel & Mehafdi 1994). You 
can use both actual costs and standard costs when calculating the marginal cost, which can 
create different outcomes. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2007). If using actual costs, it allows 
inefficiencies to be passed on to next division without any penalties for the inefficient 
division. Standard costs achieve awareness of the costs within the division and create an 
incentive to improve efficiency. The definition of full cost is the total cost of all resources 
used or consumed in production, including direct, indirect and investing costs
6
. This model is 
more utilized and offers more advantages. It provides a measure of the long run capability, it 
is easy to implement and it works well for evaluation purposes. As every model, it has its 
negative aspects. It rarely reflects the actual costs of production and it does not provide an 
incentive for the selling division to transfer internally, since there is no profit margin included 
(Merchant & Van der Stede 2007). 
Analyzing the profit mark-up, there are the questions of what it should be based on and what 
level of profit is allowed. The most used basis is the percentage of cost, but then there is no 
consideration taken to investment. Therefore, a conceptually better base is a percentage of 
investment, but the disadvantage here is the calculation of the investment that poses a major 
practical problem. The second difficulty comes with the level of profit. It should as far as 
possible approximate the rate of return that would be earned if the business unit were an 
independent company dealing with outside customers. The conceptual solution is to base the 
profit allowance on the investment required to meet the needed volume, and each investment 
should be calculated at a standard level with fixed assets and inventories at current 
replacement costs. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). The use of a profit mark-up creates 
incentives for internal trading and can provide a rough approximation of market price. A 
                                                          
4
 Merchant & Van der Stede 2007, Emmanuel & Mehafdi 1994 
5
 Business Dictionary – “marginal cost” 
6
 Business Dictionary – “full cost” 
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problem with this is that the prices do not respond to changes in market conditions (Merchant 
& Van der Stede 2007). 
 
Economic model 
The classical economic model concludes that the most profitable price-output combination is 
where the marginal revenue and the marginal cost are equal at the optimal output level. 
(Emmanuel & Mehafdi 1994). Jack Hirschleifer first described the combination of this model 
and transfer pricing; he developed a series of marginal revenue, marginal costs and demand 
curves for the transfer of an intermediate product from one business unit to another. These 
curves were used to establish transfer prices that would, under certain economic 
circumstances, optimize the total profit of the two units. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). 
This model should be used in the absence of a competitive market. Then it is assumed that the 
divisions should reach joint level of output so that the buying decision would handle as much 
output as the selling division would produce. The optimum transfer price is then set at the 
selling division’s marginal cost at the optimum output level that will maximize company 
profits. (Emmanuel & Mehafdi 1994). Even though this model finds a lot of support in 
literature, it has a number of shortcomings. (Emmanuel & Mehafdi 1994). It is only 
applicable when certain conditions exist; it has to be possible to estimate the demand curve 
and the conditions have to remain stable. There can be no alternative use for the facilities, and 
the selling unit can only produce one product, which it transfers to one single buying unit who 
in its turn use the product in one single final product. The model assumes that the central 
management sets the transfer price so that no negotiation between business units is possible. 
These conditions rarely exist in the real world so the model is hard to apply in real business 
situations. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). 
 
Linear Programming Model 
This model is based on opportunity costs and includes capacity constraints. It calculates an 
optimum company production pattern that is used to calculate a set of values that impute the 
profit contributions of each of the scarce resources. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). Two 
groups have emerged within this model: one that focuses on imperfectly competitive markets 
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and develops algorithms to determine the transfer price, and one group that applies the agency 
theory and how management can provide incentives for managers to optimize results. 
(Emmanuel & Mehafdi 1994). Even on a computer, this can lead very complex calculations, 
so to make the model manageable many simplifying assumptions must be made. These 
assumptions make the model hard to use in reality since the assumed conditions rarely exist. 
(Anthony and Govindarajan 2007).  
So what is the best model to use? There is not an answer. It depends on variables. As we saw 
before variables affect the decision very strictly. It is easier to find comparable prices to 
mature products that have been on the market for some time. But when products are new there 
might not exist a market and therefore no market price can be found. The life cycle of a 
product affects the transfer pricing decision and firms are more likely to use external market 
prices for mature products and cost-based prices for new products. Even organizational 
structure my affect the selection of the model. Let’s say that company B cannot perform its 
task until company A has successfully completed their task. Li & Ferriera calls this the long 
linked technology and they believe that the most suitable transfer price for this type of 
company is to use a cost-based pricing method. For companies that rely on feedback from 
their products with technologies that are largely customized it could be difficult to determine 
the internal prices. For this scenario, the model proposed is the negotiating transfer pricing. 
(Li & Ferriera 2008). 
Another big problem that may arise is the one related to information. As we all know, we 
have asymmetric and imperfect information that can create incorrect pricing decisions 
especially when the decisions are made by the central management. Managers or competitors 
might also be resistant to disclose information if they believe it will come to their 
disadvantage (Li & Ferriera 2008).  So the social aspect come into the game and must be 
highly considered.  
“The collectivity of individuals, or individual groups, among whom exchanges take place and 
are supported by shared norms of trustworthiness and social control mechanisms.”7 
Large organizations consist of social networks and therefore it is important for management to 
realize the significance of coordination of social capital. If trust, authority and transfer pricing 
are related they are important control mechanisms for operational efficiency. Trust among 
                                                          
7
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units will make information flow quicker and the management needs less intervention since 
the units would be working towards shared goals. When trust is high, it is appropriate with 
negotiated transfer prices. With lower levels of trust, the mutual understanding is lower and 
often requires involvement of the central management or centrally decided transfer pricing 
systems. External market prices and cost-based prices are more commonly used when internal 
trust is low. (Li & Ferriera 2008). Let’s make an example. The profit center that is selling the 
final product may not be aware of the fixed costs and profits included in the internal transfer 
price. So the selling unit can be reluctant to reduce its own profits in order to optimize the 
company profit.  
There is however some methods companies can use to reduce this problem: 
 Agreements between business units through the establishment of a formal mechanism 
deciding on outside selling prices and sharing of profits between units 
 Two-step pricing with a transfer price that includes two parts: a charge equal to the 
standard variable cost of production and a periodic charge equal to the fixed costs 
associated with the facilities. One or both of these components should include a profit 
margin. 
 Profit sharing where the internal transfer price is set to the standard variable cost and 
after the product is sold, the business units share the contribution earned 
 Two sets of prices. The manufacturing unit’s revenue is credited at the outside sales 
price and the buying unit is charged the total standard costs. The difference is charged 
to a headquarters account and eliminated when the business unit statements are 
consolidated. (Anthony and Govindarajan 2007). 
 
4. Risks and complication when dealing with transfer pricing 
 
A MNE has to overcome lots of complication related to the fact that it is actually a 
multinational enterprise. It has to cope with different international tax rates, foreign exchange 
rates, governmental regulations, currency manipulation, and other economic and social 
problems. These issues can make transactions very costly and the MNE has to create routines 
to avoid such costs. One of the most important things is to reduce the global income tax 
liability. This can be achieved by transferring goods to countries with low income tax rates at 
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the lowest possible transfer price and by transferring goods from these countries with the 
highest possible transfer price. This ability is however limited by transfer pricing regulations 
and some important issues are double taxation and unjustified additional taxation that can 
occur when countries have laws and regulations that are different (Abdallah 2004). We talk of 
economic double taxation situation when the same income is taxed twice. This happens when 
there is a conflict of interest between the tax authorities in the countries involved in the 
transaction. The tax authority in each country wants to protect their tax base, and gain as large 
income as possible. They can have laws and regulations that differ and raise claims on the 
same income. For example, there can be differences on what is considered to be the 
permanent place for the operation or different rules of what is considered to be incorrect 
pricing or transfer loss (Nguyen 2009). Example: Assume that there is a difference in 
definition of associated enterprises. Country A requires at least 50% holding to consider 
companies associated while country B requires 30%. In country A, the income tax is 25% 
while in country B 35%. Then assume that company B in country B buys goods from 
company A in country A in which they hold 31% of the shares. The cost of goods sold is 50 
and the price is set to 100.  
 
          Picture 1 -  Cross Border Transaction 
 
In country A no transfer pricing adjustments is required since the transaction does not meet 
the requirements for the definition of associated companies. They produce it for 50 and sell it 
for 100. If we then assume that Company B buys the goods for 100 and then resells them for 
80, they make a loss at the transaction and income are shifted from Country B to Country A 
which has a lower income tax. If both countries didn’t consider this as a transaction between 
associated companies the income tax would have been 12.5 payable for company A (50 x 
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0.25) and 7 receivable for company B (-20 x 0.35). This means a global income tax at 5.5 for 
the group since they transfer goods to a high price from a country with lower income tax to a 
country with higher. Country A 50% holding 25% income tax, Country B 30% holding 35% 
income tax, Cost 50, Price 100, Holdings 31%. (Strategic Transfer Pricing Ida Hjertberg & 
Sanna Pettersson Spring Semester 2010). But since the transaction lives up to the 
requirements for associated companies in country B, the tax authority will probably assert 
incorrect pricing and instead adjust the price at the purchased goods from 100 to let’s say 60. 
Company B (in a tax point of view) suddenly make a profit at 20 on the transaction instead of 
a loss, which would lead to a payable income tax at 7 (20 x 0.35). So the total global tax 
would be 19.5 since a part of the profit is rated in two countries. This incorrect pricing will 
not be advantageous for the associated companies due to the transfer pricing regulations since 
it leads to double taxation. If the group sets a correct price, according to the arm’s length 
principle, they can avoid these extra costs. Assume that an added margin at 20% of the cost of 
goods sold is a result of the arm’s length principle between the companies. Then Company A 
would sell for 60 to Company B and pay 2.5 in tax (10 x 0.25), while company B buys for 60 
and sells for 80 which means a payable income tax at 7. This gives us a global income tax at 
9.5. Not as good as 5.5 but way better than 19.5. 
 
 
Another easier example at double taxation is when a profit in a subsidiary in country A is 
taxed and then transferred to the parent company in country B where it is taxed again. 
(Nguyen 2009). An entity on the open market is generally free to determine the price in the 
business contract with regard to the business strategy. It does not necessarily mean that the 
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price has to be similar to prices charged between other independent parties on the market. 
With regard to the strategy, there could be other incentives behind the price. Say for example 
that the two companies A and B above are in a joint venture. Let’s assume that these 
companies are engaged in a transaction outside the scope of the joint venture. In that 
transaction they are two independent entities since there are no relationships with respect to 
shareholding, management or control between them. Each party act for its own interest and 
there is no economic interest between them. Hence, this transaction would in some countries 
be considered as a transaction between associated parties because they have joint venture as a 
single definition of the concept associated companies. (Nguyen 2009). Double taxation is a 
barrier that discourages investors from conducting business and investments in foreign 
countries so it may be a deterrent for transfer pricing policies. It is not beneficial for anyone 
and therefore tax authorities have developed double tax relief measures to reduce or eliminate 
international double taxation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
1. The OECD Guidelines and the Arm’s Length principle 
 
The Arm’s length principle described in the OECD Guidelines is the main key when 
analyzing transfer pricing issues. It is the final argument used between tax authorities and 
multinationals, arguing that intercompany transactions have been conducted on market 
conditions, thus no profit has been allocated to jurisdictions, which were not entitled to 
taxing. The principle does not stand alone, as it is supported by a range of tools, which can be 
applied in order to establish a reliable foundation for the dispositions taken by the 
multinational company. Eventually it supports the company in convincing the tax authorities, 
that the tax base follows the activities performed by each entity in the group and by that 
avoids double taxation. It is the international standard, which the countries that are members 
of the OECD have agreed on. The Arm’s length principle states that transactions taking place 
between companies that are related should be priced as if the companies where unrelated 
parties therefore at a market price. In this way, every part of the value chain in a multinational 
company is allocated with profit accordingly to the value that is being created; it leads to each 
country getting a tax base equivalent to the actual value created in the country. If companies 
are not following the principle, they will be able to shift profits between countries in order to 
have low margins in high tax countries and higher margins in low tax ones (Hansen & 
Andersen). Evaluating an Arm’s length price, it has to be considered not only the 
circumstances under which the transaction takes place but also the price of the transaction. 
Initially they must be identified the characteristics of the transaction, the functions performed, 
the risks assumed and assets employed, and based on that, determine the market price. It can 
be necessary to change the characteristics of the transaction if these are evaluated to be so far 
from what any unrelated parties would agree on, and then re-evaluate the price. According to 
the OECD Guidelines a tax administration’s examination of a controlled transaction should 
ordinarily be based on the transaction actually undertaken by the associated enterprises, as it 
has been structured by them, using the methods applied in compliance with the OECD. Only 
in exceptional cases, the tax administration should deviate from the actual transaction or 
substitute other transactions for them. Ernst & Young (2008 via Eden 2009) found that 
transfer pricing is currently seen as an international tax issue by MNEs and tax authorities. 
Many researchers, for example Sikka and Willmott (2010) and Kuschnik (2008), state that  
tax authorities increased their scrutiny in their tax audits especially on those related-party 
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transactions as the result of their increasing concerns on transfer pricing role in tax avoidance. 
In their studies, they find that the unfair assessment of the transfer of goods, services and 
intangible assets between MNEs can increase private gain while deteriorating the social 
welfare. That’s why in order to achieve the appropriate assessment of transfer price, OECD 
came up with the arm’s length principle, which states that the price of the related-party 
transactions will be similar as those transactions taken in the opened market (KPMG 2011: 4, 
Kuschnik 2008). According to OECD and lots of nation’s legislations, when the transfer price 
does not represent true market condition, an adjustment to the income has to be made by the 
authorities (KPMG 2011: 4-6). As said before the adjustment will be made by establishing the 
commercial and financial conditions that are expected to be incurred in the transactions 
between the independent parties. In order to adjust the price in accordance with the principle, 
a separate entity approach will be applied. The separate entity approach will treat the 
members of MNEs as if they were separate independent parties. Therefore, all companies 
within the jurisdiction will be treated similarly for tax purposes. This is to prevent the MNEs 
from taking tax advantages of tax break through mergers, acquisitions or even tax holidays, 
thus promoting the competition in business environment (OECD 2010). It is sometimes 
difficult for tax authorities and taxpayers to implement the arm’s length principle since the 
MNEs may engage in the businesses where the adequacy of data may not be available. 
Therefore, it requires lots of judgement on both parts of tax authorities and taxpayers when it 
comes to set the appropriate transfer price, the price at which can be accepted by both tax 
authorities and taxpayers (OECD). 
 
2. Transfer pricing Methods  
 
The OECD  has provided guidelines listing methods in order to determine the correct transfer 
price (OECD 2010a: 59). These guidelines aim at searching the method that is most 
appropriate for the transactions in question. In choosing the best method, the tax authorities 
and taxpayers need to consider: 
 strength and weakness of the methods  
 the reliability of the data  
 sufficiency of comparable transactions and  
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 the reliability and accuracy of the adjustment made to eliminate the significant 
differences between the transactions.  
 
In order to choose the most appropriate, it is not necessary to analyze every one for the 
transactions in question. Taxpayers are still recommended to keep the transfer pricing 
documentation on hands. It may contain informations regarding the establishment of the 
transfer price, such as reasons supporting the choosing and rejecting of a particular transfer 
pricing method, basic informations on the business industry, and reasons for entering the 
related-party transactions
8
. It is important to notice that there is not a universal method that is 
suitable to every transaction in every circumstance. Therefore, the taxpayers have to choose 
the method that can best estimate the transfer price of a specific transaction under particular 
circumstance. The reliability of the method chosen will depend on the accuracy of the 
adjustment made to establish the comparability of the transaction (OECD 2010a). 
 
 
Traditional methods 
Comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) 
The comparable uncontrolled price method compares price charged for goods or services by 
related party to price charged for comparable transactions by independent parties in 
comparable circumstances (Eden & Smith, 2001). The independent transaction will be 
compared to the related party transaction for the purpose of the comparable uncontrolled price 
method if one of the following conditions is met:  
 There is no difference that can significantly affect the arm’s length price;  
 If such difference does exist, the accurate adjustment will be made to the transaction to 
eliminate any significant effect of such difference (OECD 2010a).  
This method is considered to be the most direct way for determining the arm’s length price 
since it is made through direct price comparison. Minor difference on goods or services being 
                                                          
8
 OECD 2010a: 59-61 & 181-189 
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transferred can significantly affect the price of the transaction, so it may be difficult to find 
the comparable under this method. Therefore, the CUP is most used in transactions involving 
commodity products where the degree of similarity is high (OECD 2010a). In order to apply 
this method, taxpayers and tax authorities can search for either external or internal 
comparable. When the comparable transaction is transacted between one of the related-party 
and independent party, it is called internal comparable. In contrast, external comparable will 
incur when the comparable transaction is transacted between two independent companies 
(United Nations 2013: 193). If there is difference that have an effect on the arm’s length price, 
the appropriate adjustment will be made to eliminate such difference. In the case where 
reasonably accurate adjustment cannot be made, the alternative method will be taken into 
consideration (OECD 2010a).  
 Pro 
It is the most direct and reliable method of determining the arm's length price wherever 
comparable uncontrolled transactions are found
9
. 
 
 Cons 
CUP is built on comparable. In the contemporary era, when the vast majority of 
transactions are intra-group, it is very difficult to find comparable.
10
 The MNEs usually do 
not enter into transactions with un-related entities except with the end-consumer, so the 
chances of finding comparable in respect of intermediate transactions are rare.
11
 
 
Resale price method 
The resale price method compares gross profit margin percentage of the related-party to those 
of the independent parties performing the comparable transaction under comparable 
circumstance. It will then deduct the appropriate gross profit margin from the resale price to 
determine the arm’s length price. The gross profit margin will be high enough to cover 
                                                          
9
 OECD (2001) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Page II-
3 
10
 European Commission (2002) Company Taxation in the Internal Market, European Commission, Page 339 
11
 European Commission (2002) Company Taxation in the Internal Market, European Commission, Page 340 
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expenses and earns sufficient profit (OECD 2010a). Gross profit margin can be determined by 
reference to either internal comparable or external comparable. When the gross profit margin 
is obtained from the comparable transaction between a related-party and independent party, it 
is called internal comparable, while those obtained from the comparable transaction between 
independent parties are called external comparable (OECD 2010a). The independent 
transaction will be compared to the related party transaction for the purpose of comparable 
uncontrolled price method if one of the following conditions is met:  
 There is no difference that can significantly affect the arm’s length price;  
 If such difference does exist, the accurate adjustment will be made to the transaction to 
eliminate any significant effect of such difference (OECD 2010a) 
OECD (2010a) suggests that the resale price method is probably most useful for marketing 
operations where no unique intangible assets were added to goods or services before resale. 
They also state that when the product difference exists, fewer adjustments are needed under 
this method since gross profit is less likely to be affected by the product difference. In 
contrast, resale price method is more concerned with functional comparability; therefore, the 
tax authorities and taxpayers need to take the functions performed, risks assumed and assets 
used by resellers into account when determining the gross profit, the profit after the cost of 
goods (United Nations 2013: 200-209). Since this method compares the gross profit of the 
related-party with those of independent parties, it is important to ensure the accounting 
consistency. Tax authorities and taxpayers will keep in mind that gross profit will not be 
comparable if there is the difference in accounting practice between the related-party and 
independent parties; therefore, the appropriate accounting adjustment is needed to achieve the 
data consistency for calculating the appropriate gross profit margin (OECD 2010a: 65-69, 
United Nations 2013: 200-209). Because of its dependence on comparability of functions 
between transactions of related-party and independent parties, there must be no difference that 
significantly affects the attribute being used to measure the arm’s length condition of the 
transaction. 
 Whenever such difference does exist, the reasonably accurate adjustment is needed to 
eliminate the significant effect of such difference. It is recommended that the alternative 
methods will be taken into consideration if the reasonably accurate adjustment cannot be 
made (OECD). 
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 Pro 
It is more useful where product comparable are not available and there is no value 
addition to the product by the intermediary before resale.
12
  
 Cons 
This method is not of much help where the intermediary party is engaged in significant 
value-addition to the product before resale.13 If there is too much time-interval between 
the purchase and subsequent resale, some additional factors also needs to be considered 
like changes in market conditions, interest rates etc.
14
 The final price may be artificially 
increased for various motives including gaining a monopoly, making this method having a 
wrong starting point.
15
 
 
Cost plus method 
Cost plus method compares mark-up of the related-party to those of the independent parties 
performing the comparable transaction under comparable circumstance. It will then add the 
appropriate mark-up to the transaction cost of related-party to determine the transfer price 
(Eden & Smith 2001). According to OECD (2010a: 70-75), the mark-up will be decided after 
the computation of direct and indirect costs of production, but before the operating expenses. 
Furthermore, the mark-up added to these costs will be high enough to earn sufficient profit for 
the function performed, risks assumed and assets used. The mark-up can be determined by 
reference to either internal comparable or external comparable. When the mark-up is obtained 
from the comparable transaction between a related-party and independent party, it is called 
internal comparable. On the other hand, the mark-up obtained from the comparable 
transaction between independent parties is called external comparable (OECD 2010b). For the 
above methods, the independent transaction will be compared to the related party transaction 
                                                          
12
 Roy Rohatgi (2002) The Basic International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, London/The Hague/New York 
Page 416 
13
 Alan W. Stroud and Colin D. Masters (1991) Transfer Pricing, Butterworths London, Dublin and Edinburgh, 
Page 43 
14
 Ibid, Page 43 
15
 Peter Muchlinski (1993) Multinational Enterprises and the Law, Blackwell Oxford UK and Cambridge USA, 
Page 284 
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for the purpose of comparable uncontrolled price method if one of the following conditions is 
met:  
 There is no difference that can significantly affect the arm’s length price;  
 If such difference does exist, the accurate adjustment will be made to the transaction to 
eliminate any significant effect of such difference (OECD 2010a) 
This method is also less sensitive but is more sensitive to functional comparability. Anything 
that significantly affect the gross profit mark-up as a result of differences in functions 
performed, risks assumed and assets used, must be taken into account and necessary 
adjustments will be made to eliminate such difference. This method is most useful for 
manufacturers or service providers, where no valuable or unique intangible asset is added to 
goods being sold or services being rendered (OECD 2012b). Accounting consistency is 
therefore very important. Tax authorities and taxpayers have to know that the appropriate 
gross profit mark up will not be able to determine if there is a difference in accounting 
practices between related-party and independent parties. Therefore the appropriate accounting 
adjustment is needed to achieve the data consistency for calculating the appropriate gross 
profit mark-up. As for the other methods, the reliability of cost plus method depends on the 
comparability of the tested transaction with those of-/with independent parties. When there is 
a difference that can significantly affect the arm’s length price of the transaction, the 
appropriate adjustment will be made to eliminate such difference. Alternative methods will be 
taken into consideration if such adjustment cannot be made (OECD 2010a). 
 Pro 
This method is most suitable in respect of transfer of semi-finished goods, rendering of 
services and long-term buy and sell arrangements.
16
 
 Con 
The profit margin cannot always be calculated accurately and objectively as no business 
can always generate income as a percentage of its cost all the time under all 
circumstances.17 
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 Chris Adam and Peter Graham (1999) Transfer Pricing: A UK Perspective, Butterworths London, Edinburgh & 
Dublin, Page 21 
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Transactional  methods 
When traditional transaction methods are not good enough for setting transfer price due to 
lack of comparability or reliability, OECD (2010a) suggests the use of transactional profit 
methods. The transactional profit methods are based on the profit that arises from particular 
transactions among related-party to those independent parties. Two transactional profit 
methods that are accepted under the OECD Guidelines are the profit split method and the 
transactional net margin methods (OECD 2010a). 
 
Profit split method 
The profit split method is used when comparability doesn’t exist due to the fact that the 
transaction of related-parties is too interrelated that it is not possible to evaluate the 
transactions independently (United Nations 2013) or in cases where both related-parties have 
contributed unique or valuable intangible assets to the transaction (OECD 2010a). Such 
unique conditions can be eliminated by determining the profit of each related-party that will 
be expected to earn from engaging in the comparable transactions of the independent parties 
(OECD 2010a). To apply this method, it is necessary for tax authorities and taxpayers to 
identify the combined profit. The combined profit will be divided by the related-parties based 
on their contributions to the transaction by taking the account of functions performed, risks 
assumed and assets used. In cases where the comparable market data are available, it is 
possible for the tax authorities and taxpayers to divide the combined profit based on such 
comparable data. By doing so, the division of profit will most likely reflect what will be 
expected from the comparable transaction of the independent parties. This method will be 
equally applied in case of losses (OECD 2010a, United Nations 2013). There are two 
approaches used to split the profit among related-parties: 
 Contribution analysis: The main idea of this approach is to allocate the combined 
profit among related-parties as if it is expected to be split among independent parties. 
In cases where the external market data is available, such combined profit will be 
allocated by reference to the market data to reflect the division of profit in the 
comparable transactions of independent parties. However, in cases where such 
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external market data is not available, the profit will be split based on the value of their 
relative contributions by taking the account of functions performed, risks assumed and 
assets used (OECD 2010a, United Nations 2013). 
 Residual profit split analysis: OECD (2010a) states that there are two stages of profit 
division under this approach. In the first stage, after the combined profit has been 
identified, the sufficient profit will be split among the related-parties based on their 
functions performed. In this stage, the profit being allocated will account for the 
routine functions performed by each related party. Practically, this part of profit can be 
determined by using either traditional transaction methods or transactional net profit 
margin (TNMM). In the second stage, the residual profit will be split among the 
related-parties based on the facts and circumstances of the transactions; therefore, the 
treatment of this part of profit division will be varied case-by-case. The division of 
profit in this stage will account for the unique or valuable assets used in the 
transactions. The residual profit split analysis is often used in cases where the unique 
or valuable assets are contributed by both the parties of the transaction. On the other 
hand, resale price method, cost plus method or TNMM will be used where the unique 
or valuable assets are contributed by only one party of the transaction (United Nations 
2013). 
In order to determine the combined profit under this method, it is necessary for the tax 
authorities and taxpayers to find the relevant transactions needed to be covered and all 
parties involved in the transactions. The combined profit used to split among the related-
parties under this method is usually the operating profit (loss); however, gross profit can 
be used if it deems appropriated (OECD 2010a). To apply the profit split method, it is 
necessary to take the reliability of the method into account. Since the implementation of 
this method generally depends on facts and circumstances of cases and on the availability 
of information’s, tax authorities and taxpayers must allocate profit that will be most likely 
expected in the comparable transactions of independent parties. To be able to approximate 
such division of profit the functional analysis, the determination of combined profit and 
splitting factors and the approach used for determining the division of profit of the related-
party, will be consistent with those used by independent parties. Moreover, accounting 
practice can be different between businesses, therefore the adjustment of the accounting 
data is needed to maintain the accounting consistency. Without this consistency, the 
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appropriated division of profit and thus the arm’s length price can’t be done (OECD 
2010a). 
 Pro 
The method does not place reliance on comparable and so can be used in their 
absence.
18
 It gives due consideration of specific and unique factors present in an MNE 
and absent in comparable unrelated entities.
19
 It avoids arriving at the unrealistic 
figure of profit, because both parties to the transaction are examined.
20
 
 Cons 
The method is less direct and less reliable than traditional methods.
21
 Allocation of costs to 
property and services rendered in controlled transactions between related parties may be 
difficult to decide.
22
 
 
 
Transactional net margin method 
The transaction net margin method (TNMM) is the indirect method used to find the arm’s 
length price of the related-parties transactions by comparing the level of profitability of 
related-parties transaction with those of independent parties. It is usually used to compare 
the net profit margin acquired by related-parties transaction with those acquired by 
independent parties. When determining the net profit margin, the appropriate base such as 
cost, sale or asset, must be chosen carefully (United Nations 2013). Similar to resale price 
and cost-plus methods, the net profit indicator of TNMM can be determined by reference 
to either internal or external comparable. When the net profit indicator of related-parties is 
reference to the net profit indicator obtained in the transactions between related-parties 
and independent parties, it is called internal comparable. On the other hand, the external 
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 4 OECD (2001) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Page 
III-3. 
19
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20
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Dublin, Page 18. 
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 Chris Adam and Peter Graham (1999) Transfer Pricing: A UK Perspective, Butterworths London, Edinburgh & 
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comparable is obtained in the transactions between independent parties. To implement this 
method, the tax authorities and taxpayers need to identify the tested party, the participant 
of the related-party transaction used to apply transfer pricing. Basically, the least complex 
party with no valuable or unique asset will be chosen since it has more reliable 
information available and less adjustment needed to establish the comparability (OECD 
2010a & 2012b, United Nations 2013: 223-224). Unlike the resale price and cost-plus 
methods, TNMM uses the net profit instead of gross profit. Therefore, TNMM is more 
appropriate in cases where two previous methods cannot be used due to the inaccurate 
adjustment of gross profit. The net profit used to determine the transfer price under this 
method is generally the operating profit, the profit before interest and income tax 
expenses. Operating profit under TNMM will only include incomes and expenses from 
normal operating activities that are related to the transactions in question into transfer 
pricing calculations; any extraordinary items, such as nonrecurring activities, will be 
excluded from such calculation (OECD 2010a). The comparability analysis is also 
required in applying the TNMM. Where price and gross profit margin can be significantly 
affected by product and function differences, respectively, net profit margin under TNMM 
is less likely to be affected by such differences. However, the net profit margin can be 
significantly affected by elements such as difference in cost of capital, degree of business 
experience and management efficiency, that are unrelated to transfer pricing. To mitigate 
the impact of the inaccuracy of comparative informations due to the effect of such factors, 
TNMM has established the arm’s length range for the transfer price instance of one single 
transfer price. Furthermore, the accounting adjustment is needed to maintain the 
accounting consistency and thus comparability between parties. Without the accounting 
consistency, the reliability of comparable will not be established. Similar to other 
methods, the reasonable adjustment will be made to eliminate any differences between the 
tested parties and comparable that significantly affect the comparability of the transactions 
(OECD 2010a). The appropriateness of profit level indicator (PLI) to be used for 
comparing the level of profitability between comparable and tested parties depends on the 
facts and circumstances of the cases. The PLIs that are commonly used in practice are the 
return on equity employed (ROEC), the return on equity (ROE) and the operating profit 
margin (OM). According to various studies, it was found that when the assets have played 
a significant role in generating income, for example in manufacturing businesses, it is 
recommended to use the ROEC or ROE, in which denominators come from balance sheet. 
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On the other hand, the businesses such as service providers and distributors that are not 
relied on fixed assets to generate income will use the PLIs with income statement figure as 
denominator. Sometimes, it may be useful to examine several profit level indicators for 
particular transactions. If the multiple PLIs are used and such indicators yield the 
consistent results, it will reassure the reliability of the examination. Instead, the 
inconsistent results may inform that additional functional analysis may be needed (United 
Nations 2013). 
 
 Pro 
Net margin is less likely to be affected by transactional differences than it is with the 
price (like that in CUP) or with the sale price margin (like that in RSM).
23
 The 
determination of functions performed and risks involved is not required.
24
 This 
method is relatively simple because it examines only one party to the controlled 
transaction.
25
 
 
 Cons 
Unlike tax authorities, the taxpayers may not have access to the information on 
comparable transactions.
26
 The taxpayer or tax authorities in accordance with their 
desired value can manipulate this method by choosing the comparable companies that 
suit them for this purpose.
27
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3. Comparability analysis    
 
To establish the transfer price that will be justifiable for the tax purpose, it is important to find 
the arm’s length price of the comparable transactions under comparable circumstances of the 
independent parties. Since such arm’s length price relies on the reliability and comparability 
of the transaction, the comparability analysis comes into play. The aim of this comparability 
analysis is to obtain the highest degree of comparability of the transactions. It will be kept in 
mind that reliability and availability of the data are needed to be taken into consideration 
when searching for the comparable to establish the closest approximation of the arm’s length 
price
28
. As always, the transactions will be comparable if there is no difference that can 
significantly affect the arm’s length price or such difference can be eliminated by the 
appropriate adjustments. To establish the comparability and make any appropriate 
adjustments as needed to achieve the arm’s length conditions, the attributes of transactions 
such as the characteristic of goods and services, the functional analysis, the contractual terms, 
the economic circumstances and business strategies that can significantly affect the arm’s 
length price, must be compared. The degree of importance of such attributes to the 
comparability depends on the nature of transactions and transfer pricing methods being used. 
(OECD 2010a: 43). 
 
 
Characteristics of assets and services 
We know that the difference in characteristic of assets and services can end up with difference 
in value of assets and services. Therefore, tax authorities and taxpayers need to consider this 
when evaluating the comparability of the transactions. There are several important 
characteristics that need to be considered when making comparison; for example in the case 
of transfer of tangible assets, they are physical features, quality of the assets, volume and 
availability of supply and demand. Nature and extent of service will be taken into account 
when determining the transfer price for services transferred. In case of intangible asset, the 
duration and form of assets, for example, will be taken into account (OECD 2010a: 44). 
Different transfer pricing methods will give different weight to this feature. Since CUP is the 
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direct transfer pricing method, it gives the highest weight to this feature. Any difference in 
this feature can lead to the price difference; therefore, the appropriate adjustment will be made 
to establish the comparability. In contrast, there are few characteristics of assets and services 
that can significantly affect gross profit margin under resale price and cost-plus methods; it is 
even less likely to affect the net profit margin in TNMM.
29
 
 
Functional Analysis 
In the opened market, the compensation of the transaction between independent parties will 
reflect the functions performed, assets used and risks, assumed that each party to the 
transaction undertakes them. The functional analysis will compare economic activities and 
responsibilities, which can significantly affect the arm’s length price undertaken by the parties 
to the transaction. When making the comparison, the activities that need to be considered are 
for example research and development, marketing, distribution, manufacturing and production 
process. Furthermore, the consideration in assets used and risk assumed will also be included 
in this comparability analysis. The assets mentioned here can be either tangible assets such as 
research and development equipment, vehicle and property and plants and equipment’s, or 
intangible assets such as patents or trademarks. Furthermore, tax authorities and taxpayers are 
required to identify who bears the risks, for example financial risks, market risks and 
production risks assumed in the transaction, since such risks can also reflect in the arm’s 
length price.
30
 
 
Contractual terms 
The contract generally will consist of the sections that state how responsibilities, risks and 
benefits will be divided among the involved parties in the transactions. The terms of 
transactions can be found in either written or verbal arrangement. However, where such 
arrangement is impossible, the terms of transaction can be evaluated from the economic 
substances or functions performed by the involved parties. The tax authorities will examine 
whether the arrangement made between the related parties has been implemented since the 
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incompliance can mislead the tax authorities in evaluating the appropriated transfer price. 
Furthermore, it will be noted that difference in contractual terms between those of related-
parties and independent parties can significantly affect the price or margin of the transactions; 
therefore, the appropriate adjustment is required as necessary
31
. 
 
Economic circumstances 
Since the price of the transactions can be varied across the markets even though the products 
sold or services are similar, there is a need to identify the relevant market when finding the 
comparable. Furthermore, there are additional several economic circumstances, for example 
the business cycle, the extent of competition, the nature of government regulation and the 
time of transactions, which will be taken into considerations when making the comparability 
analysis. Depending on the fact and circumstance of the cases, the difference in economic 
circumstance that can significantly affect the price of the transactions will be identified and 
appropriate adjustments will be made to eliminate such effect.
32
  
 
 
Business Strategy 
This feature compares the factors that are relating to the daily operations of the businesses. 
Such factors are the diversification of businesses, the launching of new products and market 
penetration. If the taxpayers have implemented the business strategy for market penetration, 
for example by setting low transfer price with the hope to earn higher income in the future, 
there are several things tax authorities will do when evaluating the transfer price of related-
parties transactions. The tax authorities will investigate the conducts of the related-parties to 
ensure that they are consistent with the business strategy. Furthermore, the nature of the 
relationship between the involved parties will reflect the taxpayers who bear the cost of such 
business strategy. Tax authorities sometimes can challenge the MNEs on the transfer pricing 
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issue if the implementation of the business strategy has not earned sufficient profit over 
several years (OECD 2010a: 49-51 United Nations 2013: 145-148). 
As described above, the most important things when evaluating an intra-group transaction are 
its characteristics, the kind of risks carried by each party, assets invested and functions 
undertaken. If a similar transaction is undertaken by third parties this can be used to determine 
the most appropriate arm’s length price. If this is not the case, for example there are 
differences in the risks assumed, an adjustment compensating for the differences has to be 
made. But also, in the light of the financial crisis, the economical circumstances in a country 
could mean greater adjustments, especially if comparable that are between one and five years 
old are used. When selecting the transfer pricing method, the most appropriate method in each 
given situation should be used in order to determine the correct arm’s length price. One 
method is not preferred to the other, and each situation calls for an evaluation of which 
method to apply. Thus, it is important to know the characteristics of the transactions, as well 
as what comparable data is available. In the figure below, the impact on the company’s profit 
and loss statements by each transfer pricing method is showed. 
 
 
Picture 2 - Transfer pricing methods and price basis 
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4. Anti-Transfer Pricing Measures 
 
Measures undertaken by the International and Multilateral Organizations 
The United Nations (UN) in its Guidelines 1984 encouraged the exchange of information on 
transfer pricing among member states and discussed the mechanism of tax evasion and tax 
avoidance providing  CUP, RSP and CPP, the methods for the determination of the arm's 
length price.
33
 The UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries 2001 (UN MC) adopted the concept of transfer pricing in the Article 9 
of the OECD MC. It also has provisions for a mutual agreement procedure (Article 25) and 
exchange of information (Article 26).
34
 The OECD, as already seen, has dedicated a lot of 
time and energies to determine its tax implications and to evolve the measures to counter its 
undesirable effects. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which is the main body of the OECD 
regarding tax policy, issued various reports on transfer pricing, which include: Transfer 
Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (the “1979 Report”), Transfer Pricing and Multinational 
Enterprises: Three Taxation Issues (the “1984 Report”), Tax Aspects of Transfer Pricing 
within Multinational Enterprises: The United States Proposed Regulations (1993) and 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (the “1995 
Guidelines”). The 1995 Guidelines suggest to use any of the traditional methods for the 
computation of the arm's length price and reserves the other methods in circumstances when 
the traditional methods cannot be applied. The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital (OECD MC) provides for the adjustment of profits between associated enterprises in 
Article 9. This provision is usually construed to be recognition of the arm's length price, as 
stated within the OECD Guidelines 1995. There are only few such treaties, like between the 
Nordic and Benelux countries. These have provisions for exchange of information.
35
 With the 
diffusion of transfer pricing as a tool of tax avoidance and shifting of profit, the governments 
of most countries enacted counter-acting legislations and framed rules and regulations to try 
to reduce the efforts on tax avoidance, enabling them to receive their fair share in the tax 
revenue relatable to the income generated from economic activities having nexus with that 
country. Let’s see s briefly the example of the USA and the UK. 
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USA 
The section 482 (allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) empowers the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to apportion and allocate 
income and deductions among the related enterprises. Section 482 is short and simple 
consisting of only two sentences. The first sentence sets up a general rule empowering the 
IRS to apportion and allocate income, deductions, credits or allowances between entities 
related to each other by common ownership or direct or indirect control when such 
apportionment or allocation is necessary to prevent tax evasion or to reflect their true income. 
The second sentence deals with super royalty and provides that any transfer or license of 
intangible assets must be at the price considering the subsequent income generated from 
them.
36
 Section 482 has been supplemented by detailed regulations (regulations 1.482-0 to 
1.482-8, 1.901-2(e)(5)(i) and 1.6662-6). Like section 482, the transfer of tangible and 
intangible properties has been dealt separately by providing separate methods in the 
regulations. Under these regulations, the prescribed methods for the determinations of the 
arm's length price for the transfer of tangible property are CUP, RSP, CPP, Comparable profit 
method and other reasonable methods. For the transfer of intangible property the methods are 
CUP, CPM and other reasonable methods. The IRS has also issued guidelines on the 
enforcement of the section 482 cases incorporated in the Internal Revenue Field Manual. 
Case’s laws decided by US courts on this issue are also helpful in this regard. Transfer pricing 
adjustments by tax authorities on basis of section 482 are frequently disputed by taxpayers 
leading to litigation. According to Judge Nims, Chief Judge of US Tax Court, in 1990, more 
than 200 cases of alleged transfer pricing manipulations were filed by the IRS which involved 
understatement of profit from $ 10 millions to $ 6 billions.
37
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UK 
General and special provisions on transfer pricing have been incorporated in domestic 
legislation in accordance with the Article 9 of OECD MC and OECD Guidelines.
38
 
 
5. Formulary apportionment 
 
Right now the normal approach in taxation is to treat the affiliated entities as separate legal 
persons maintaining separate accounts, filing tax returns and paying taxes to the tax 
authorities of the country which holds jurisdiction over them on basis of nationality, residence 
or source. An adjustment is made to transactions in regards to transfer prices which fail to 
meet the arm’s length standard. Any resultant double taxation is remedied by unilateral relief 
(either by straight exemption or credit method) or by bilateral double taxation treaties. Unitary 
taxation has been suggested as an alternative to this separate entity approach and arm's length 
principle. It is claimed that this system would remove all the anomalies and drawbacks 
associated with the current practices to avoid the inappropriate transfer pricing. First 
introduced in California it is in use at sub-national level by provinces of Canada and US 
states. Its use has been suggested for cases involving the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). All the related entities carrying out income-generating economic 
activities within or out of the country of origin are treated as one unit (“unitary business 
enterprise”, “unitary business group”, “unitary business,” or “global taxable unit”). The total 
world income or global taxable income (or loss) of this unitary business enterprise (generated 
by all its related entities) is computed (global profit assessment). Thereafter, this income is 
apportioned in a pre-determined mathematical formula (“apportionment formula”) evolved on 
the basis of predetermined factors (“apportionment factors”). The share of each state is 
distributed to all states that apply its own tax rates in accordance with its domestic tax laws 
and rules.
39
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“A unitary business is the smallest division of a firm or a group of firms, the income of which 
can generally be accurately indicated by separate accounting.”40 
It is important to know in what way entities are to be clubbed together for unitary business 
and what should be the basis for such inclusion. The US system, which is the pioneer in this 
approach, does not provide any strict objective criteria for that. Generally, different 
approaches have been set by the US courts. 
Three unities approach 
This approach was adopted by US court in Butler Brothers v McColgan by declaring that a 
business is unitary if there are three unities: 
 unity of ownership (like shareholding etc),  
 unity of operation (like purchase of equipments and incidental items, 
advertisement, common accounting facilities, common legal representation, joint 
efforts in expanding the business and inter-company financing, parent guarantees 
etc)  
 unity of use (like inter-company transfer of products, shared directors and officers, 
transfer of executive personnel and public image).
41
 
Contribution and dependence approach 
This approach was adopted by US court in Edison California Store declaring a business 
unitary when an economic activity carried on in one state is dependent on or contributes to 
business activity in another state.
42
 
Centralized management, functional integration and economies of scale 
These factors were considered relevant by the US Supreme Court in Mobil Oil v 
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont.
43
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Flow of values 
The flow of values as against the flow of products was considered to be the main 
characteristic of the unitary business by US Supreme Court in Container Corp of America vs. 
Franchise Tax Board. It may exist when there is functional integration, centralized 
management, economies of scale, management of affiliates by the parent, engagement in the 
same line of business and non-arm’s length transactions. 
Computation of Total Taxable Income 
The total divisible income of the unitary business enterprise from all economic activities is 
determined. 
Apportionment Formula 
At present different apportionment factors are being the basis of the apportionment formula. 
These include supply or sale factors (quantum of sales of goods and receipts from rendering 
services), property factors and payroll factors (contribution of labor in generating income). 
44
 
So analyzing this way of counteracting transfer pricing problems we can see that if the unitary 
taxation is adopted worldwide, it would result in lots of benefits for states and taxpayers. First 
of all entities within a unitary business, earning taxable profits from economic activities in 
different countries, will be taxed only once at one place; no further tax liability would arise 
and the taxpayers will no longer be subjected to different tax jurisdictions in respect of its 
foreign affiliates.
45
 It will boost and facilitate international trade since there will be freedom 
of transactions between affiliates and major uncertainties in matter of international taxation 
like transfer pricing adjustments resulting in the elimination of conflicting and overlapping 
jurisdictions.
46
 Since all the states will be getting their due fair share in tax revenue, these will 
no longer need to appease the MNEs for making investments in their jurisdiction by indulging 
in harmful tax practices like tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes. There will be no 
race to the bottom or harmful tax competition between states. There will be a reduction of  the 
administrative cost of tax collection by states and the compliance cost (monetary and time 
costs) of taxpayers. Shifting of profit by the MNE from one country to another for tax 
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consideration will be discouraged. Finally, neither the transfer prices between related-parties 
will need to be monitored, nor will determination of the arm’s length price be necessary and 
consequently the problems of transfer pricing related tax avoidance will be solved once and 
for all. But this approach doesn’t have only positive things. It also has negative aspects. It has 
not been favored by international organizations so far. It was considered and rejected in 
Ruding Report, 1992133, in the OECD Guidelines and disapproved by the Group of Four 
Report of April 19882. Secondly, it has received a lot of criticism from the US and foreign 
MNEs as well as foreign governments. MNEs have threatened the boycott and foreign 
governments have announced retaliatory legislations. The UK government, vide section 54 of 
the Finance Act 1985, has been empowered to retaliate if a British company is taxed on 
unitary basis.
47
 Thirdly, a single apportionment formula covering all the industries and 
sources of income may be difficult to devise.
48
 Fourthly, a precise definition of the unitary 
business and the parameters for inclusion of business entities in it have not been agreed upon 
so far. Fifthly, there will be exchange rate problems for taxpayers as well as tax collectors.
49
 
Sixthly, it may create conceptual confusions like abandoning the well-established separate 
entity and limited liability doctrines. Seventhly, the measurement and valuation of the 
apportionment factors like property (tangible and intangible), sales etc, may pose various 
problems. Finally, it will be difficult to collect the informations and books of accounts 
necessary to compute taxable income from foreign affiliates because of low competence to 
enforce compliance and lack of jurisdiction. 
 
6. Anti-Transfer Pricing Strategies In Practice  
 
Transfer Pricing Adjustments on the Basis of the Arm’s Length Price 
 
The main objective in determining the  arm’s length price through various methods previously 
seen is to make a transfer pricing adjustment in order to bridge the difference between the 
transfer price and the arm's length price. Therefore, tax authorities make appropriate 
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adjustments (called transfer pricing or primary adjustments) to the transactions and profits 
based on difference between the arm's length price and the transfer price, as provided in the 
domestic legislation of the country. There are currently two approaches for the determination 
of the arm's length price  
 negotiated approach as adopted by UK tax authorities  
 strict rules and regulations in determination of the transfer prices, as followed by US. 
The transfer pricing (or primary) adjustment based on the arm's length principle can result 
in a number of further problems like disagreement by the MNE on the arm's length price 
determined by the tax authorities, leading to litigation and refusal of another country to 
make correlative or secondary adjustments leading to double taxation. 
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) 
The unilateral determination of the arm’s length price by tax authorities is frequently 
disputed and litigated by the taxpayers, besides creating uncertainty in taxation. Some 
countries have tried to resolve these problems by negotiating agreements with the 
taxpayers on the methodologies to determine transfer prices before any dispute arises. 
Such an agreement, called an advance pricing agreement or arrangement, is binding on all 
parties.
50
 It may be unilateral (between taxpayer and one tax authority), bilateral or 
multilateral (involving more than one tax authorities).
51
 The APA procedure was first 
introduced in the US in 1991 and followed by other countries. It has various advantages 
like the removal of elements of uncertainty, the reduction of compliance costs, the 
fostering amicable milieu between taxpayers and tax collector, the avoidance of time and 
money consuming litigation and reduction of economic double taxation (bi- or multilateral 
APAs). However, it has certain drawbacks arising from unpredictable change in market 
conditions, disagreements on APA’s conclusions on various transactions, lack of 
corresponding adjustment by tax authorities of other countries and misrepresentation or 
fraud in concluding APAs.
52
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Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements 
The requirement of reporting and disclosure vary from country to country. However, each 
country prescribes minimum criteria of transactions to be reported to tax authorities for 
records and books of accounts to be maintained.
53
 
Penalty Provisions 
Penalties are instruments of compliance and deterrence to the delinquents. These penalties 
are either flat-rate penalties (for various defaults like non-filing of returns or any 
documents) or the percentage penalties (for various defaults like underreporting or 
concealment of income) which are calculated as the percentage of tax sought to be 
avoided.
54
 
Exchange of Information 
The article 26 of OECD MC and UN MC provides for exchange of information in tax 
matters between tax authorities. The majority of the bilateral avoidance of double taxation 
treaties has similar provisions. Such exchange is very helpful in undoing tax effects of 
inappropriate tax prices.
55
 
Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duty (ADD) 
In all WTO signatory countries, if an entity sells a product in a country other than the 
country of origin at less than its normal value (less than the sale price in the exporting 
country or less than the cost of production), the importing country can impose 
antidumping duty (ADD) not exceeding the amount of margin of dumping, as per 
provisions of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT).
56
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7. Transfer Pricing And Shareholders’ Value 
 
Transfer pricing, currently, is recognized as the most important international tax issue by both 
MNEs and tax authorities around the world (Ernst & Young 2006 via Sikka & Willmott 
2010). The recent research by United Nations (2013:1) has found that related-parties 
transactions are accounted for about thirty percent of international trade. From this research, it 
can be noticed that transfer pricing is increasing its importance in today’s world trade. Since 
MNEs operate its businesses in several jurisdictions where tax rate may be differed, it is 
possible that such MNEs will take the advantage of such tax difference through transfer 
pricing to reduce its global tax expenses. Baker states that by mispricing the related-parties 
transactions the MNEs can facilitate tax avoidance and capital flight from developing 
countries to developed countries, thus deteriorating the social welfare
57
. He also shows that 
more than sixty percent of illicit flow of capital around the world are accounted for tax 
evasion through transfer pricing, which is two times more than criminal activities, bribery and 
theft. As the result of the loss of tax revenue from the aggressive transfer pricing by MNEs 
together with the budget deficit, tax authorities around the world have come up with several 
methods to protect their tax bases and meanwhile increasing their tax revenue. They are 
increasing their scrutiny in tax audit by tightening up the transfer pricing regulation and 
legislation, training more tax officials in transfer pricing area, enforcing a high documentation 
requirement and imposing high financial penalties. There are evidences shown that by 
increasing their scrutiny in tax audit, especially in the area of transfer pricing, the 
governments can collect additional tax payment from millions of dollars to billions of dollars 
each year
58
. MNEs will notice that different countries may adopt and apply their transfer 
pricing laws and regulations differently; and by not complying with countries’ legislations, it 
can put the MNEs at risk of additional income tax adjustment, penalties and even double 
taxation
59
. As the result of such undesirable consequences which can eventually increase the 
effective tax rate and thus hurt the shareholders’ value, several transfer pricing experts have 
suggested that transfer pricing should be taken into the risk management issue; the board of 
directors and top management will be aware of their corporate transfer pricing practice and 
take it into consideration when making a strategic planning that can affect their tax structure 
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and their tax position
60
. According to Kobel (2009), there are several risk factors that MNEs 
will consider when setting their transfer pricing strategy: 
 tax audit risk (so called cashflow risk); 
 accounting risk; 
  reputation risk; 
  and regime risk.  
 
Tax audit risk is the risk of being audited by one or more tax authorities which can end up 
with the unexpected cash outflow relating to previous accounting period as the result of tax 
incompliance. Accounting risk is the risk associated with the unexpected change in the 
company’s financial position as the result of unexpected accounting adjustments. Reputation 
risk is the risk that company will lose its reputation from having negative headline news. 
Regime risk is the risk of unexpected change of future cash flow due to the change in 
governmental legislations. These risk factors can significantly affect shareholders’ value, and 
that can be seen from several cases; the most recent and famous cases are Starbucks, Amazon 
and Google operating its businesses in United Kingdom. These MNEs have been challenged 
by Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) for not paying taxes or less taxes than their 
competitors through the use of transfer pricing strategy
61
. We will see the example of 
Starbucks as a demonstration on how such risks can affect the shareholders’ value. We all  
know that businesses have the obligation to maximize its shareholders’ value. However, as 
the corporate governance is increasing its importance in today’s business world, businesses 
need to take other stakeholders’ interest, especially tax authorities, into account when doing 
their businesses
62
. According to Cadbury (Cools 2005), good corporate governance will 
provide the transparency and accountability of the fair income distribution between 
shareholders and society and thus, between tax jurisdictions. Starbucks, through the use of 
transfer pricing, has paid its corporate income tax to HMRC only once, just about £8.6 million 
over the past fifteen years during its operation in United Kingdom; it avoided its tax payment 
over the past three years by making payments to its related-party in Netherlands and 
Switzerland for its royalty fee and coffee bean respectively. Since Reuters has exposed its 
complex tax arrangement, the UK public has demanded Starbucks to make tax payment to 
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HMRC. Likewise, some of coffee drinkers have boycotted Starbucks and shifted their 
preference to Costa coffee. According to the preference survey by YouGov, they find that 
Starbucks coffee drinkers have dropped from 22.7% to 15.4% after its tax arrangement has 
been exposed, while the Costa coffee drinkers have risen from 31.8% to 39.4%. To protect its 
reputation, Starbucks has announced that it will claim no tax deduction on related-parties 
transactions fee in 2013 and 2014. Furthermore, it will voluntarily pay £10 million in 
corporate income tax each year in 2013 and 2014, which amount is two times more than taxes 
been paid to HMRC over fifteen years of its operation in UK.
63
 From the Starbucks case, we 
can see that the associated cost of transfer pricing will be considered as the tax expenses, 
which will eventually reflect in the global effective tax rate of the MNEs. Kobel (2009) has 
demonstrated how effective tax rate can have the impact on shareholders’ value by simply 
computing economic value added (EVA) of the MNEs. EVA is the tool used to evaluate 
whether the management has created or destroyed the shareholders’ value by evaluating the 
true business profit after accounting for the cost of capital. 
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From the above formula, it can be advised that MNEs can simply create the shareholders’ 
value by following: (1) minimizing the effective tax rate of the enterprise, (2) increasing its 
efficiency in generating revenue from invested capital (or capital turnover), and (3) increasing 
profitability by reducing costs and improving its production efficiency (or operating profit 
margin) (Kobel 2009). Since transfer pricing is considered as one of the potential way to 
minimize MNEs’ global effective tax rate and vice versa, it is essential for top management 
and even board of directors to involve transfer pricing issue into risk management
64
. As 
Angeline Ziouslas (via Financial Post 2013), a transfer pricing expert, claims that transfer 
pricing is the art not the science, the MNEs can be put at risk when implementing transfer 
pricing as it is in the grey area of the interpretation of fair share of taxes between tax 
jurisdictions. Therefore, to prevent tax dispute with tax authorities, several researchers and 
transfer pricing experts have suggested MNEs to use the proactive approach to minimize risks 
associated with transfer pricing practice. The approach includes the establishment of transfer 
pricing policy, improvement of tax department efficiency, acquiring the experts or their 
advice in setting their transfer pricing strategy and entering into advanced price agreement 
(APA) (Financial Post 2013, Sikka & Willmott 2010). According to Kobel (2009), Ziouslas 
(via Financial Post 2013), Sanschangrin and Isensee (2013), they find that such proactive 
approach can improve the shareholders’ value as a good proactive approach will provide the 
MNEs with spare time, effort and money necessary for managing its businesses.  
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Chapter 3 
1. Transfer pricing in Italy 
 
In the last few years in Italy, a lot of attention has been given to transfer pricing. Until 2010 
this was related to a delocalization process since we were experiencing companies that were 
relocating their manufacturing activities out of Italy into countries with low production costs, 
developed infrastructure, tax incentives and a skilled labor force aiming at a long-term 
strategic response to the increasingly challenging business environment. Furthermore, highly 
centralized business model structures resulting from supply chain restructuring became the 
norm within multinational enterprises with a concentration of high-value intangibles and 
entrepreneurial functions and risks in tax-advantaged jurisdictions. In 2010, Italy established 
the penalty protection documentation rules together with the early recognition of the 2010 
OECD Guidelines. In the annual tax return now, Italy also requires the reporting of the totals 
of inter-company transactions. These changes have significantly intensified the importance of 
transfer pricing with a much broader level of awareness and general interest. Transfer pricing 
has also become one of the key audit and tax adjustment areas in the past year from the 
perspective of the Italian tax authorities. 
Statutory rules  
The Italian Income Tax Code sets the Statutory rules on transfer pricing in Article 9 and 
Article 110. Article 110, paragraph 7, states that components of the income statement of an 
enterprise derived from operations with non-resident corporations that directly or indirectly 
control the enterprise, are controlled by the enterprise or by the same corporation that itself 
controls the enterprise should be valued on the basis of the normal value of the goods 
transferred, services rendered and services and goods received, if an increase in taxable 
income would arise thereby. Because of the normal value rule, possible reductions in taxable 
income are allowed only based on mutual agreement procedures or on the European Union 
(EU) Arbitration Convention. Article 9, paragraph 3, affirms that ‘normal value’ means the 
average price or consideration paid for goods and services of the same or similar type, carried 
at market conditions and at the same level of business, at the time and place in which the 
goods were purchased or the services were performed. To determine the normal value, 
reference should be made to the extent possible to the price list of the provider of goods or 
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services. In the absence of the provider’s price list, reference should be made to the price lists 
issued by the Chamber of Commerce and to professional tariffs, considering usual discounts. 
The translation of the above statutory rules into operating guidelines was effected through the 
Ministry of Finance instructions in Circular Letter No. 32/9/2267, dated 22 September 1980. 
The Circular Letter imparts principles and methods to be utilized in determining normal 
value. Its current status is now unclear, as it is based on the 1979 OECD Transfer Pricing 
Report, and the transfer pricing documentation provisions introduced by Law Decree 78 of 31 
May 2010 make clear reference to the 2010 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines. Tax auditors have applied the Circular Letter for many 
years and may continue, even though the International Office of the Italian Tax Authority 
discourages this. In some situations, local practice in the field continues to deviate from the 
most updated OECD position. Transfer pricing documentation provisions have been included 
in Law Decree 78 of 31 May 2010, which was converted into law on 30 July 2010. For 
enterprises that comply with the documentation requirements it provides a penalty protection 
regime, including the detailed format as set out in a Regulation dated 29 September 2010 and 
that notifies possession of documentation when they file their tax returns. The provision of 
compliant documentation relieves taxpayers from the normal regime of tax geared penalties 
on adjustments since the adjustment relates to a transfer pricing matter. 
Burden of proof  
The burden of proof lying with the ITA
65
 is the general principle; however, in the event of an 
assessment by the tax authorities, the taxpayer has to demonstrate the fairness of its inter-
company transactions. Particular rules apply to cross-border transactions involving 
counterparties (including third parties) resident in tax havens. The Italian taxpayer must 
provide evidence that the foreign party is a genuine commercial undertaking, that the 
transactions were effected in connection with a real economic interest and that the relevant 
transactions actually took place in order to deduct the relevant costs; they must be disclosed in 
the company’s tax return otherwise penalties will apply. The rules relating to such costs are 
independent from Italian transfer pricing rules.  
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Tax audit procedures - Selection of companies for audit  
The ITA focuses on major taxpayers therefore on multinationals. From 2002, at least once 
every two years taxpayers with turnover above 26 million euro are expected to be 
systematically audited; moreover, at least once every four years, taxpayers with turnover 
exceeding EUR 5.2 million will be audited. These audits can be complete and extensive or 
focus just on specific items such as transfer pricing. They are considered as a general 
guideline for tax audits even if these parameters, introduced by Article 42 of Law 388/2000, 
are not consistently met, as stated by Revenue Office Circular (hereinafter Circular) 6/E, 
dated 25 January 2008. Provisions concerning ‘large taxpayers’ were introduced by Law 
Decree n. 185/2008
66
. The decree provides that companies with turnover exceeding EUR 100 
million will be audited by dedicated tax offices. Also as confirmed by Circular Letter 21/E of 
18 May 2011, ITA should focus attention on large taxpayers. It is also increasing the level of 
exchange of information with foreign tax authorities. Law Decree 78 of 31 May 2010 
included the provision of information and duty of the taxpayer to cooperate with the tax 
authorities Transfer pricing documentation provisions. The Regulation of 29 September 2010 
contains detailed specification about the form and content of this documentation. 
The Regulation is based on the EU Code of Conduct for Transfer Pricing Documentation and 
follows the concept of master file and country file.  
The Master File will contain information about the group and will be structured as follows: 
 General description of the Multinational Group  
 Group structure 
 General strategies pursued by the Group and any changes of strategy compared to the 
prior financial year 
 Flow chart of the intercompany transactions 
 Intercompany transactions 
 Functions, assets and risks 
 Intangible assets 
 Transfer pricing policy 
 APAs and rulings concerning transfer pricing with the tax authorities of EU Member 
States.  
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It is possible to deliver more than one Master File if the MNE operates in different sectors, 
each of them being governed by specific transfer pricing policies. 
The National File will contain information about the company and will be divided as follows:  
 General description of the company 
 Sectors in which the company operates 
 Operational structure of the company 
 General strategies pursued by the company and any changes of strategy compared to 
the prior financial year 
 Intercompany transactions 
 Cost Contribution Arrangements. 
The Master File as well as the National File are required to be presented by the Holding 
companies or permanent establishments of holding companies. Sub-holding companies and 
permanent establishments of sub-Holding companies are required as well to present them. A 
sub-holding company can present together with the National File, the Master File prepared by 
its non-resident holding company. Controlled companies and permanent establishments of 
controlled companies are only required to present the National File. The records must be kept 
for at least 10 years. Italian-based groups, which include non-Italian subsidiaries, must 
produce both a master file and a country file; Italian subsidiaries need to produce only a 
country file. An Italian sub-holding company with at least one non-Italian subsidiary must 
produce a sub-holding master file as well as a country file, although it can choose to produce 
the group master file if compliant as to form and content. This requirement of a sub group 
master file also applies to an Italian branch of a company that has non Italian subsidiaries 
regardless of whether the investments are held by the Italian branch. Both documents must be 
prepared in Italian, but an Italian sub-holding company can produce a master file in English 
provided the file is for the entire EU-based group. Annexes can be in English. The 
documentation is not required but the regulation states that whether or not a company has 
communicated its existence, it will influence the tax authorities in their risk assessment as an 
indication of taxpayer transparency and willingness to cooperate. The documentation that is 
considered to meet the requirements of the regulation will protect taxpayers from tax-geared 
penalties on any transfer pricing adjustments. The format is mandatory and prescribed in 
detail. If the taxpayer has notified possession of such documentation by 28 December 2010 or 
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at any point thereafter until a tax authority audit or visit take place, the penalty protection is 
also applicable to past open years. However, once an audit begins, the opportunity is not 
available anymore. On tax auditor request, the documentation must be produced within 10 
days. If requested, taxpayers have a further seven days to produce additional supplementary 
information. The penalty protection is lost if the taxpayer is unable to meet these deadlines. 
The transfer pricing documentation must be produced annually. Small and medium 
companies
67
 need to perform the method selection and economic analysis part of the 
documentation only every three years, provided there has been no significant change in the 
business and that the economic analysis is based on public available databases. The 
company’s legal representative must sign on each page and the documentation must be 
submitted electronically. The regulation does not impose specific methodologies but refers in 
general to the 2010 OECD Guidelines emphasizing the preference for traditional transaction-
based methods. General rules on tax documentation also continue to apply to inter-company 
transactions. In accordance, the company should be able to substantiate all income and 
expense items. During an audit, the ITA may require taxpayers to produce documents or other 
information (also in the form of answers to questionnaires). In this case, taxpayers must 
comply with the requests. An assessment may be made based on the tax authority’s 
assumptions if a taxpayer fails to submit the documentation within the time frame provided in 
the tax authorities’ request.  
The audit procedure  
Tax audits in Italy are normally based on the taxpayer’s premises; the duration of an on-site 
tax audit may not exceed 60 days of presence at the taxpayer premises; at the end, the 
authorities release a report with findings and proposed adjustments. Within 60 days the 
company may file a defense brief or rebuttal against the tax audit report with the relevant tax 
office. The tax office may not issue a tax assessment until the 60 days have elapsed. Tax 
authorities will not necessarily issue an assessment immediately after the 60 days expire, and 
the formal assessment may not appear for some time. Tax issues, including transfer pricing, 
may be settled with the tax authorities without litigation. The relevant procedure was 
introduced by Decree 218/1997 and is termed accertamento con adesione. If an agreement is 
reached, an official report is produced showing the amount of taxes, interest and penalties 
due. In the event a settlement is reached, penalties are reduced to 33% of the total amount 
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due. Once litigation begins, the company and the tax authorities may still settle the dispute out 
of court. They are required to take into consideration this option if they have not already done 
so. The procedure, introduced by Article 48 of the Decree 546/1992, is called the judicial 
settlement procedure. In the case a settlement is reached during the judicial settlement 
procedure, penalties are reduced to 40% of the total amount due. If the dispute is decided in 
court against the taxpayer, the penalties are applied in full. There are three stages before a 
final judgment is reached with no further prospect of appeal: First Instance (provincial), 
Second Instance (regional) and Supreme Court or Corte di Cassazione. Unless a suspension is 
obtained while the dispute is pending, the tax authorities are allowed to collect 50%
68
 of the 
tax assessed before the first instance decision is given; two-thirds of the tax (and penalties) 
due, following the first-degree judgment; and the total taxes (and penalties) due, following the 
second-degree judgment.  
Resources available to the tax authorities  
There are units dedicated to transfer pricing, and the number of audits has increased in recent 
years. There are more qualified personnel performing audits, and staff members in local 
offices have also received transfer pricing training. The Italian administrations have created 
specific task forces to monitor larger companies on all their tax issues, with particular 
emphasis on transfer pricing and permanent establishments. 
Use and availability of comparable information 
A taxpayer’s documentation is expected to include a benchmark analysis showing that the 
results earned by the company are within the arm’s length range of results realized by 
comparable companies to support their transfer pricing policy. Under the penalty protection 
rules, the Italian tax authorities have indicated that, except for small and medium sized 
enterprises
69
, they expect to see a new benchmark (including new company selection) each 
year. Italian companies are required by law to file their financial statements with the local 
Chamber of Commerce. Hence, it is possible to obtain detailed data on the results of other 
companies, including extensive notes in many cases. These can be accessed online by 
taxpayers and tax authorities. There are databases allowing research of comparable companies 
at the European and Italian levels. The Italian tax authorities have access to these.  
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Risk transactions or industries  
In 2008, the Italian tax authorities
70
 issued Circular Letter n. 6/E, dated 25 January 2008. It 
highlights for consideration international transfer pricing as well as inter-company 
transactions between resident Italian companies when an internal transfer pricing issue could 
occur because of the presence of a favorable tax regime. The focus on transfer pricing was 
confirmed by Circular Letter n. 13/E of 9 April 2009 and Circular Letter n. 20/E of 16 April 
2010. The Italian Tax Police
71
 issued Circular Letter n.1/2008 containing guidelines to be 
followed by its officers when performing tax audits. Chapter 6, titled ‘International Tax and 
Tax Audits Methodologies’, provides operative guidelines for tax officers when they assess 
companies on transfer pricing and permanent establishment issues. The circular provides 
specific criteria for officers to identify Italian companies whose inter-company transactions 
attract particular attention.  
 Transactions with foreign-related companies in jurisdictions where they benefit from 
favorable tax regimes.  
 Transactions concerning intangible assets (such as royalties) and services 
(management fees).  
 Transactions where the Italian company acts as a mere intermediary (commissionaire, 
agent) and receives a commission-based remuneration.  
 The sale of high-value intangible properties by the Italian company to foreign entities.  
 
Limitation of double taxation and competent authority proceedings  
Italy has begun to use the EU Arbitration Convention and has given a boost to mutual 
agreement procedures for intra-EU issues. The use of the competent authority process to 
obtain correlative adjustments has not been common in Italy in other circumstances to date. 
Some aspects of the mutual agreement procedure have been clarified by the Italian Tax 
Authority in Circular No. 21/E of 5 June 2012. Some key points of the Circular are:  
 It is not possible for an agreement under MAP or the Arbitration Convention to 
override an Italian court judgement or any negotiated settlement between 
www.pwc.com/internationaltp 533 I the Italian tax authorities and an Italian taxpayer. 
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Hence, a court judgment or an out of court settlement will preclude any alternative 
outcome in Italy at competent authority.  
 An Italian taxpayer must appeal the tax assessment in order to apply for MAP under a 
bilateral tax treaty. For an Arbitration Convention procedure to go ahead, however, the 
taxpayer must be prepared to withdraw from the tax appeals procedure.  
 It is possible to continue with appeals on other matters not covered by MAP or the 
Arbitration Convention at the same time as embarking on the mutual agreement 
procedure for transfer pricing issues.  
 The process for requesting that the collection of tax assessed in Italy be suspended 
varies between MAP and the Arbitration Convention. However the implication is that 
suspension should be granted in both cases. 
 Concerns that the automatic referral in Italy of a tax adjustment above a certain (low) 
threshold for consideration in the criminal courts constitutes a ‘serious penalty’ and 
hence prevents access to the Arbitration Convention are confirmed to be groundless. 
This should be evaluated on a case by case basis.  
 If an agreement under MAP is successfully concluded and the circumstances have not 
changed, the Circular recognizes the possibility of also applying the terms for the 
years immediately subsequent to those of the MAP.  
Advance pricing agreements (APAs) 
On 23 July 2004, an official procedure was published for a so-called ‘International Ruling’, 
which had been introduced by Article 8 of Law Decree No. 269 of 30 September 2003. This 
advance ruling is unilateral, although it is possible to achieve a bilateral effect by using two 
unilateral agreements. From the last part of 2010, the ITA particularly has increased the 
number of instances where a bilateral process with other countries is followed. The procedure 
involves companies engaged in ‘international activity’ and may cover transfer pricing, 
dividends, royalties and interests. The following may apply:  
 Italian resident enterprises that have transactions that fall under the Italian transfer 
pricing rules and/or entities that are owned by non-resident shareholders or 
themselves own non-resident entities and/or enterprises that receive or pay dividends 
interest or royalties to or from non-Italian persons.  
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 Any non-resident company carrying on activity in Italy through a permanent 
establishment.  
The ruling application must be submitted to one of the competent offices (i.e. Milan or Rome 
office, on the basis of a company or permanent establishment tax residence, although any 
application interested in invoking a bilateral approach needs to be made in Rome). The 
information to be included in the ruling application under penalty of non acceptance is:  
 General information concerning the company, such as the name, its registered office, 
its tax and VAT identification number, and so on.  
 Documentation that proves the eligibility requirements.  
 Scope of the application and the purpose of the ruling request.  
 The signatures of the legal representatives. 534 International Transfer Pricing 2013/14 
Italy  
 
The relevant rulings office may inform the taxpayer to appear to verify the accuracy of the 
information provided and to define terms and conditions for the subsequent negotiations 
within 30 days from the receipt of the application or from the completion of any inquiry 
activity. The full procedure should be completed within 180 days from the filing of the 
request, but the parties may agree to extend the deadline. In practice, the APA negotiation 
procedure is generally a long process. Once an agreement has been reached, it remains in 
force for three years (the year in which the agreement is signed and the two following years). 
There is no formal rollback provision either for years before the application was made or for 
years subsequent to the application but before the agreement was signed. The taxpayer may 
ask for a renewal within 90 days before the expiry of an existing APA agreement. The 
Revenue Office must approve or decline a renewal at least 15 days before the agreement 
expires. In 2010, the ITA issued a report of the number of APAs achieved and in process as at 
31 December 2009, with some analysis of time taken, methods used etc. The number of 
applications has increased significantly since that date.  
Anticipated developments in law and practice  
Under the relevant tax treaties the ITA has indicated on more than one occasion that it hopes 
to establish a framework for bilateral APAs. As indicated above, it appears that the ITA is 
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now doing this on a wider basis even though there has been no formal announcement of 
change.  
OECD issues  
Italy is a member of the OECD and uses the OECD Guidelines in bilateral dealings with other 
tax authorities. Reference has been often made to the 1995 OECD Guidelines by taxpayers in 
the absence of detailed and up-to-date local regulations, but the 1980 Ministerial Circular still 
tends to be a tax auditor’s first point of reference until the law changes. The Italian courts 
have recognized the 1995 Guidelines as persuasive. It is also important to note that in relation 
to other OECD material (e.g. the OECD Model Treaty Commentary), the Supreme Court 
limited the role of the OECD Commentary in three identical decisions relating to a permanent 
establishment case, all in 2006. This was held not to have legislative value, but to represent a 
recommendation that may not override local law. The 29 September 2010 regulation on 
transfer pricing documentation explicitly refers to the 2010 OECD Guidelines, to the EU 
Code of Conduct as the basis underlying Italian documentation and to the transfer pricing 
methodologies of the OECD Guidelines.  
In joint investigations on 1 May 2006, Italy became the 12th party to the joint OECD Council 
of Europe/ OECD Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters. As a party to the 
convention, Italy enhances its ability to combat tax evasion and avoidance through exchange 
of information on a wide range of taxes. The other parties to the convention are Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and 
the United States. A key feature of the convention is the ability to take part in simultaneous 
multilateral examinations. Some joint investigations occurred.  
Deductibility of interest payable  
The 2008 Finance Act (24 December 2007 Law no. 244) replaced the previous limitations on 
interest deduction (i.e. thin capitalisation and pro rata rules). The new rule states that payable 
interests and similar charges are fully deductible in each fiscal year, to the extent of receivable  
interest and similar income. In addition, any excess of payable interest over receivable interest 
is deductible up to 30% of EBITDA. The non-deductible amount may be carried forward 
without any time limit. The new interest deduction limitation does not apply to certain 
taxpayers, including individual entrepreneurs, partnerships, banks, financial entities, insurance 
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companies and their holdings. It does apply, however, to holdings of industrial and 
commercial groups. The rule applies to interest due, both to related parties and to third parties. 
 
2.  Law Cases examples 
 
In the last few years, there have been a number of court decisions relating to transfer pricing. 
The most important cases are summarized below; they provide general principles on various 
points (i.e. concept of free competition, arm’s-length definition, burden of proof and 
necessary documentation for deducting inter-company service charges). Decisions from the 
Supreme Court represent the final judgment in an Italian tax case. Provincial and regional tax 
court decisions represent first and second instances.  
The Judgment No. 13233 of the Supreme Court, fiscal division (October 2001), deals with the 
concept of ‘free competition’. An Italian company subjected to assessment (ITCO) purchases 
goods from its foreign parent. The Italian tax authorities (ITA) adjusts the purchase price on 
the grounds that it is not at arm’s length. The ITCO appeals to the court and claims that 
transfer pricing provisions are not applicable in this case due to the absence of free 
competition in this sector in Italy; only one other Italian company produces the same product, 
and it is under the license from its foreign parent. The court determines that in order to speak 
of ‘free competition’, it is enough that a similar product is sold in Italy without any legal 
restriction on pricing. There is no need to have ‘ideal’ free competition. For this reason, the 
court rejects the appeal.  
The Judgment No. 130 of the Tax Court of Tuscany (January 2002) concerns the definition of 
‘arm’s-length value’. The tax court states that normal value can be determined by reference to 
average data from the sector in particular, data provided by the trade association to which the 
Italian resident company belongs, or data confirmed by financial statements from Italian 
companies in the same sector. 
The Judgment No. 253 of the Tax Court of Ravenna (November 2002) concerns a non-
interest-bearing loan made to a controlled non-resident company. An ITCO grants a non-
interest-bearing loan to a controlled company resident in Luxembourg. The ITA assesses 
interest income at the ‘normal value’ based on the Italian Bankers Association (ABI) prime 
rate. The ITCO is not able to justify the reasons for having granted a significant non-interest-
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bearing loan to its foreign affiliate when the ITCO bore interest costs on its own external debt. 
The tax court recognizes that the inter-company loan should have generated interest 
receivable for the Italian company as argued by the ITA. 
The Judgment No. 1070 of the Tax Court of Vicenza (February 2003) concerns inter-
company sales made without mark-up. An ITCO sells raw materials to a German related 
company at a price equal to the purchase price without any mark up. Based on data in the 
company’s financial statements, the ITA derives an average mark-up on costs released by the 
ITCO in its other operations (38%) and applies this mark-up to the sale of the raw materials. 
The tax court determines that the assessment should be cancelled for the following reasons:  
 The operation under review is of negligible value compared with the volume of 
purchases and sales made by the ITCO as a whole.  
 The operation is not comparable with the company’s usual inter-company transactions 
(ITCO’s business activity consists of sales of finished products). 
 The operation is undertaken for the purpose of allowing the German company to 
produce a particular product to sale to an important Italian client. The aim was a 
significant increase of  the ITCO’s overall business. 
The Judgment No. 13398 of the Supreme Court, fiscal division (September 2003) concerns 
the burden of proof. An ITCO (in a tax loss position) applies to sales made to its French 
parent company at a 6% rebate once a certain sales threshold is reached. The ITA considers 
that the rebate is not justified by reference to costs and risks deriving by the French company 
and subsequently determines an adjustment on the ITCO, arguing that the company should 
have demonstrated that the rebate was justified by reference to distribution costs and risks 
derived by the parent company and consequent savings for the ITCO. A matching of savings 
and rebates is considered necessary to show that the prices applied are in line with those 
applied to the third parties. The court decided that in the absence of the required benefits 
demonstration, the ITA adjustment was correct. 
The Judgment No. 158 of the Tax Court of Milan (June 2005) concerns the documentation 
necessary to support the deductibility of inter-company services charges. An ITCO receives 
charges from its foreign parent company under a multilateral service agreement. The ITA due 
to alleged lack of documentation considers these charges non-deductible. The Milan Tax 
Court decides in favor of the ITCO, judging that it has presented sufficient documentation to 
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show the certainty of the costs sustained and that the costs were related to the ITCO’s 
business, including:  
 Written agreement describing the services provided.  
 Comfort letter issued by a major audit firm attesting that the cost allocation have been 
correctly performed and that the attribution of costs to the various group entities have 
been made on the basis of the benefits they received.  
 Invoices containing a detailed description of the services performed. 
  Demonstration that the costs borne, with reference to the services received, were 
correctly recorded in the accounting records and included in the financial statement of 
the Italian company.  
 Documentation describing, for each type of service, the nature of the activity 
performed and the advantage received by the Italian company 
The Judgment No. 22023 of the Supreme Court, fiscal division (October 2006) sets the 
important principle that the inappropriateness of a company’s transfer pricing must be proved 
by the ITA, which bears the burden of proof that the company does not comply with the 
arm’s-length principle. An ITCO purchases cars from foreign related companies and bears 
repair and maintenance costs on new cars without adequate remuneration. The ITA argues 
that this causes a reduction in the Italian tax base and an increase of profit for related 
companies resident in low-tax jurisdictions but does not provide any real evidence of this. The 
court decides in favor of the ITCO because the ITA do not demonstrate that the group’s 
transfer pricing is unfair. The court refers to the OECD Guidelines, which expressly state that 
if the local jurisdiction provides that the tax authorities should set the reasons for any 
adjustment, the taxpayer is not obliged to prove the correctness of its transfer prices unless the 
tax authorities have first demonstrated that the arm’s-length principle has not been observed. 
The Judgment No. 52 of the Tax Court of Pisa (February 2007) concerns the applicability of 
the CUP methodology. The ITA issues a notice of assessment on an ITCO, a company 
operating in the garden pumps market, to cover revenue resulting from the sale of products to 
a French related party at a price lower than the normal value. The ITA compares the sale 
prices applied to third parties with those applied to the French related company, observes that 
the intercompany prices are lower by about 10%, and assesses the difference. However, the 
court agrees with the arguments of the taxpayer, which demonstrates that the transactions 
taken by the ITA are not comparable as regards to the stage of commercialization, the 
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volumes involved, and the number of shipments. These differences would be sufficient to 
justify a 10% difference in the sale price. The court states that the ITA should at least carry an 
analysis of the tax rates in force in the two countries and the comparable transactions. 
The Judgment No. 9497 of the Supreme Court, fiscal division (April 2008) concerns the 
power of the ITA to verify the appropriateness of compensation agreed between Italian 
resident companies. An ITCO have an existing contract with its directly controlled Italian 
refinery for the receipt of certain refinery oil services. The refinery compensation is 
guaranteed to cover all the plant’s fixed costs and variable costs and provide a fair profit 
margin. Both the ITA and the provincial tax court disallow the profit margin paid by ITCO to 
the refinery. However, the regional tax court decides that the service received by ITCO is 
definitely related to its own operations, and any requirements in transfer pricing and anti-
avoidance provisions that would allow the ITA to disregard the agreement between the parties 
are not met. The Supreme Court revokes this judgment, determining that the ITA may verify 
the amount of costs and profit in financial statements or tax returns and make relative 
adjustments where there are no accounting irregularities or errors in legal documents. The 
ITA may deny deductibility, in fully or in part, where a cost is considered to be without 
foundation or is disproportionate. Therefore, the ITA is not bound to the values or the 
compensation arrived at in company decisions or contracts. 
The Judgment No. 20 of the Regional Tax Court of Bologna (April 2008) concerns the 
deductibility of management costs derived from a written contract between the parties prior to 
the cost recharge and the use of a percentage of turnover mechanism. An ITCO is charged 
certain management costs by its parent based on a lump sum linked to estimated turnover. The 
ITA disallows the deductibility of these costs as there are no analysis of their nature and, 
therefore, it might be assumed some are not relevant to the ITCO’s business. The ITCO 
argues that although it is part of a group, it is not fully controlled, as there is a 35% minority 
interest. The services are agreed and performed on the basis of a written agreement signed 
before the fiscal year in question. The contract states remuneration for these services (equal to 
2.86% of turnover), which should be considered arm’s length. The regional tax court agrees 
with the taxpayer arguments taking into account the fact that the ITA’s case is based on mere 
assumption. The ITA does not prove the absence of services or that the services have no 
bearing on ITCO’s business. 
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The Judgment No. 87 of the Regional Tax Court of Milan (March 2009) concerns the 
application of the arm’s-length principle to intercompany sales in a multinational group. The 
ITA issues a notice of assessment on an ITCO (a contract manufacturer) for fiscal year 2003, 
on the basis that the ITCO have sold finished goods to a Swiss related company at a price 
lower than the arm’s-length price in order to transfer income to Switzerland. The ITA’s 
challenge is based on the fact that the Swiss company sold the same products to an Italian 
reseller in the group at a higher price. The ITCO claims the higher price charged by the Swiss 
company to the Italian reseller is justified for the following reasons: 
 The Swiss company owns the trademarks and patents; performs research and 
development; and bears the foreign exchange, credit, and inventory risks.  
 The ITCO performs manufacturing for the Swiss company and does not bear any 
inventory risk as a contract manufacturer.  
 The Italian reseller performs finishing activities based on local market preferences and 
manages the sales network.  
The court cancels the assessment, as it does not consider the ITA have discharged the burden 
of proof to show the prices to be non-arm’s length. Moreover, the court considers that the 
sales prices from ITCO to the Swiss company are in line with those applied by the Swiss 
company. 
The Judgment No. 5926 of Supreme Court, fiscal division (March 2009) concerns the 
deductibility of inter-company costs charged by a non-resident entity to its permanent 
establishment in Italy. The case deals with the determination of certain overhead costs 
(administrative expenses, flight operations, and maintenance of the fleet) related to the 
international airline business and paid by a company resident outside of Italy also for its 
permanent establishment in Italy. The ITA issues a notice of assessment on the ITCO for 
1998, disallowing costs that it considers undocumented. The provincial tax court confirms the 
ITA’s position. ITCO appeals to the Supreme Court, claiming that it was not possible to make 
a detailed individual analysis of costs as they were incurred by the overseas company and 
charged pro rata to the branches based on the latter’s sales. The financial statements and the 
auditor’s report are appropriate to support the non-resident company costs charged to Italy, 
unless the tax office could show errors committed by the auditor. The Supreme Court agrees 
with the taxpayer and confirms that the auditor’s report on the financial statements is 
sufficient to support the costs registered in the annual financial statements. 
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The Judgment No. 396 of the Provincial Tax Court of Milan (January 2010) concerns the 
transfer of functions and risks from an Italian company to another firm of the group for 
registration tax purposes. The case deals with the conversion of an Italian entity operating as a 
fully fledged manufacturer into a toll manufacturer with the relocation of certain functions 
and risks to a Swiss related company. The ITA argues that this operation represented a 
transfer of a going concern, subject to registration tax. The ITA issues a notice of assessment, 
which is challenged by the ITCO. The Provincial Tax Court of Milan determines that the 
mere transfer of risks and functions does not represent a business transfer and therefore no 
registration tax is due. 
The Judgment No. 7343 of the Supreme Court, fiscal division (March 2011) concerns the 
application of rebates on inter-company sales. The case regards the application of discounts 
granted by an ITCO on sales to intercompany entities. The ITA makes a transfer pricing 
adjustment disallowing the discounts on the grounds that no discount is granted on sales to 
third parties. The ITCO argues that the transactions are not comparable since the goods sold 
to related parties are at a different stage in the production/distribution chain. The Supreme 
Court confirms the ITA view, rejecting the ITCO’s arguments by a lack of comparability. 
The Judgment No. 134 of the Provincial Tax Court of Reggio Emilia (March 2011) concerns 
the possibility that the taxpayer is exempted from the burden of proof. The court states that 
the burden of proof in transfer pricing cases is on the ITA, which has to demonstrate that the 
inter-company transactions, as implemented by an ITCO, are not at arm’s length. The ITA has 
to determine the ‘normal value’ of the transactions and demonstrate that a tax advantage is 
achieved by the ITCO (i.e. taxation in the counterparty’s country was lower than in Italy). 
The Judgment No. 580 of the Tax Court of Lazio (September 2011) concerns the application 
of a different transfer pricing method by the ITA compared to the method selected by ITCOs 
for its intercompany transactions. The taxpayer calculates its inter-company prices based on 
the return on capital employed (ROCE). The ITA argues that the ROCE is not the appropriate 
ratio and makes a transfer pricing adjustment based on what is described as TNMM but 
without further reference to the ratio. The Tax Court of Lazio rejects the ITA’s challenge 
based on the following reasons: the ITA should have demonstrated both the lack of economic 
reasons underlying the ROCE and that the ITCO was pursuing a tax avoidance strategy. The 
Court states that since the ITA did not provide the above evidences and ROCE is an indicator 
provided by OECD, the application of an alternative method compared to the one chosen by 
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the taxpayer is not legitimate. The Tax Court also comments on the benchmark analysis 
performed by the ITA recognizing the lack of comparability of some comparable found by the 
Office. 
The Judgment No. 129/19/2011 of the Tax Court of Lombardia (October 2011) concerns the 
burden of proof in relation to transfer pricing disputes. This case concerns the prices applied 
by an Italian manufacturer to the Group Swiss Principal. In particular, the ITA compares these 
prices with the prices at which the principal sold the same goods to an Italian related 
distributor. This approach results in an adjustment since the prices between the principal and 
the distributor are higher than those applied by the manufacturer to the principal. The Tax 
Court rejects the ITA’s adjustment for the following reasons: the prices between the principal 
and the distributor, as inter-company prices, do not represent a market comparable; the 
company demonstrates the business reasons of the principal structure; the ITA does not 
challenge any violation of tax law in Switzerland or Italy; the fact that both the manufacturer 
and the distributor are resident in Italy and their premises are close to each other is not 
relevant since the whole business model underlying the transactions needs to be considered. 
The Judgment No. 80/27/12 of the Tax Court of Lombardia (June 2012) concerns the 
deductibility of inter-company services charged. The case relates to a challenge by the ITA to 
the deduction of costs charged by its French parent to an ITCO for administrative, legal, 
accounting and fiscal services and the costs related to the implementation and maintenance of 
the operating software. In particular, the ITA challenges that these costs are not deductible 
because the taxpayer did not demonstrate that these were relevant to its business activity (art. 
109, par. 5 Italian Tax Code). The ITCO, in order to prove the deductibility of the costs, 
produces: the inter-company contract signed before the services was provided, describing the 
nature of services provided; the monthly reports summarizing the activities performed by the 
service provider; spreadsheet showing the costs incurred by the service provider and the 
allocation of these costs to the Group recipients. The Regional Tax Court states that the 
evaluation of the deductibility of service costs should be made applying the transfer pricing 
principles stated by the OECD, particularly regarding the analysis of the benefit provided to 
the recipient. According to the Tax Court, the existence of the above mentioned 
documentation and, in particular, the consistency between the contractual provision and the 
services actually supplied, is sufficient to demonstrate the actual provision of the services and 
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the benefit for the recipient. Therefore, the Tax Court acknowledges the deductibility of the 
service costs. 
The Judgment No. 11949 of the Supreme Court, fiscal division (July 2012) concerns the 
burden of proof in cases of adjustment of costs. An ITCO is an Italian distributor of software 
purchased from a UK related party. Close to the year-end, the ITCO received a transfer 
pricing adjustment from the UK entity increasing the transfer prices of the goods supplied 
during the year. The ITA challenges the deduction of this year-end adjustment. It is worth 
mentioning that the Regional Tax Court denies the ITA challenge. The Supreme Court 
acknowledges that the arm’s-length principle (Art. 110, paragraph 7 of the Italian Income tax 
code) is an anti-avoidance provision and, accordingly, the burden of the proof of the 
taxpayer’s avoidance aims lies with the tax authorities. However, since the challenge 
considered here, related to inter-company costs incurred by the Italian taxpayer, the latter has 
to demonstrate that the costs are necessary for its business activity and resulted in a benefit for 
the Italian taxpayer. The Supreme Court states that the ITCO did not provide evidence of the 
benefit deriving from the costs challenged particularly regarding the year-end adjustment; the 
transfer pricing study prepared by the company to support its transfer pricing is not 
considered sufficient. 
 
3. Case companies – Volvo and Innovo Ltd. 
 
Volvo 
Volvo was incorporated in 1915 as a subsidiary of AB SKF, the Swedish ball bearing 
manufacturer. In 1924, the two founders decided to start the construction of a Swedish car and 
three years later, it left the factory in Gothenburg. This was the birth of Volvo. A year later, 
they sold their first manufactured truck, which was an immediate success, and during the 
1930s, they started to produce buses. Since then their range of products has been increased 
with aircraft engines, terrain vehicles, marine engines etc. Volvo cars were though sold out to 
Ford Motor Company in 1999. Today Volvo Group includes 20 different companies with 
sales activities in more than 180 countries and production facilities in 19 countries, which one 
of them is in China. (AB Volvo Group) At Volvo Ida Hjertberg & Sanna Pettersson (2010) 
interviewed Mr. Lars-Eric Ericson whose current position is responsible for international 
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taxation and transfer pricing. Mr. Ericson has been employed at Volvo since 1996 but his 
experience on transfer pricing goes back to the middle of the 1980’s by several different 
positions at the Swedish authorities and companies. 
Strategy at Volvos 
As we have seen in the previous pages, theory provides a variety of models for calculating 
transfer prices and each model has its advantages as well as disadvantages. The choice of the 
model depends on the company structure, on organization goal and on the product or service 
sold. Within each and every model, different methods and approaches can be used, and that 
can result in as many different transfer pricing strategies as there are MNEs. Volvo operates 
in the manufacturing industry and has chosen a centralized model where the decisions on 
transfer pricing are taken from the management and local companies have limited 
opportunities to make decisions. Inside Volvo’s company, there is a department that is 
responsible and ensures that the different companies inside the group follows transfer pricing 
policies. This is to avoid not being in compliance with the law and directives. Hjertberg & 
Sanna Pettersson (2010) state that Mr. Ericsson at Volvo is sure that transfer prices should be 
separated from the operational activities. 
“For Volvo it is not the tax optimization that is most important, it is the fact that the group 
can use their resources all over the world without any tax obstacles.”72 
In the Hjertberg & Sanna Pettersson (2010) paper, they explain that for Mr. Ericsson it needs 
to be possible to move know-how or technology from one country to another without any 
major tax concerns. That is why Volvo has chosen a business model where all intellectual 
property is owned from Sweden with the Swedish companies representing all the risks, while 
other companies are guaranteed a fixed result for their services. Mr. Ericson added that Volvo 
has divided their companies into two different types, Entrepreneurs and Service Providers. 
Entrepreneurs within Volvo group are situated in Sweden; all other companies are Service 
Providers. The Entrepreneurs
73
 are risk takers and the Service Providers perform defined 
services to the entrepreneurs. These services can be within research & development (R&D), 
production and distribution etc. The Service Providers are guaranteed a specific result for 
their services hence the entrepreneurs are the ones taking all the risks. In good times, the 
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entrepreneurs are the ones making high profits while in bad times they take all the losses. The 
Service Providers are not affected by the external market to the same extent, as their result of 
a business always is secured in advance. The guaranteed result is decided by Corp Tax and 
based on comparable transactions. The group companies involved are then responsible for 
setting prices to meet the guaranteed result. As a general rule, Volvo always tries to use the 
described result model based on comparable transactions, but depending on the service, other 
methods can occur. For example, the method of return on capital employed can be used within 
production, cost plus method within R&D and other services.  
 
                         Picture 3 - Volvo's Strategy 
The result based business model with one company taking all the risks makes it possible to 
develop and produce products in any country but pay the research and development from 
Sweden with a mark-up for the subsidiary’s costs. This allows the product to be sold to any 
country within the company group without any occurring transactions between the producing 
country and the buying country. All transactions are gathered in Sweden, which is favorable, 
as Volvo often has quite complex transactions with several countries involved. Parts of one 
engine can be produced in several different countries and then sold to yet another; if there was 
not one single owner and risk taker it would have been almost impossible to sort out the 
proportion of the profit for each participating unit. By coordinating the transactions, it 
facilitates to sort them out and makes it possible to move technology and production between 
countries. 
 
 Innovo ltd.  
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Established in 2012, Innovo Engineering & Construction Ltd. is an independent 
manufacturing and engineering company based in Aberdeen (UK). It is devoted in providing 
high value professional services and high technology equipment for subsea 
telecommunication, offshore renewables, Oil & Gas and marine business scenarios. It designs 
and manufactures dedicated machinery utilized for various scenarios: from cables and flexible 
laying, riser recovery, wellhead installation, pipeline repair, deep-water oil & chemical agent 
recovery up to subsea well inspection and maintenance working at both high environment 
pressure and high temperature. In 2014, INNOVO pushed technology beyond its limits, 
delivering the largest capacity and operationally proven Powered Reel Drive System available 
in the Offshore Oil & Gas and Renewable Industry, the INNODRIVE-600. One year later, the 
company already obtained the appraisal for the INNODRIVE-800, reaching new heights in 
terms of product capacity. In September 2015, INNOVO also obtained the European Patent 
for the MODULAR INNODRIVE technology, an innovative jacking system purposely 
designed to guarantee safer operations, reduced environmental impact and significantly 
increased time and cost effectiveness. Innovo also has another product in its portfolio. The 
Jack-up that this year has been supplied to the Italian Research Center in Naples. On this 
product, Innovo has another Patent. This shows how Innovo is a Company that dedicates itself 
in research and Development and in innovative products focusing on intellectual property of 
their own developments.  STEA s.r.l is the Italian branch of INNOVO and is 100% owned by 
INNOVO.  
 
 
                                      Picture 4 - Innovo's Ownership 
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Based in Padova, it provides engineering services and personnel highly skilled and qualified 
for any operation that Innovo sub contracts, or any other job that is obtained in in the 
Mediterranean area. Localization is in fact strategic for the group as a whole.  Innovo ltd. 
covers the North Sea area and Stea covers all the Mediterranean area. This guarantees the 
company a big flexibility and the ability to cover the main areas for the Oil&Gas sector. As 
the relationship between Stea s.r.l and Innovo is quite tight and transactions between the 
parent company and the subsidiary ones are very common, it’s not rare that Innovo Ltd., due 
to its high volume of work, from time to time has to subcontract to Stea engineering works, 
expedition activities or other services such as trademark licensing or certifications, in order to 
fulfill all the requests it receives.  This has given rise to the transfer pricing problem. In order 
to avoid going against the law and being eligible for future fines by the ITA, Innovo has 
decided to develop its own manual on transfer pricing thus showing their own will on being 
transparent and in compliance with EU directives and OECD guidelines on transfer pricing.  
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Strategy at Innovo 
 
As said before, there are various models that companies may use. Innovo is actually using the 
cost plus method, as we saw in Chapter 2. It is more suitable in respect of transfer of semi-
finished goods, rendering of services and long-term buy and sell arrangements. In order to 
explain better how the application of this method is done by Innovo, we can see the following 
example. Let’s say that Innovo has to subcontract to Stea a repair service that has to be carried 
out by Stea personnel. Things will go as follow. Stea will study the requested service, analyze 
and forecast the costs that it will incur in carrying out the work and decide a lump sum that 
would include all costs. Once the costs are analyzed, Stea will apply the usual mark-up that is 
used when providing these kind of services, securing the company a profit. Innovo will then 
issue the purchase order, and once the job is done, or at certain stages of the work, invoices 
will be done by stea and paid by INNOVO. In this way we are certain that the transfer price is 
in compliance with the arm’s length principle and the price respects comparable transaction, 
since the final price is only based on the cost plus a mark-up as if the service or good was sold 
to a third party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Picture 5 - Innovo's Strategy 
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Conclusion 
 
“Because transfer pricing is not an exact science, there will also be many occasions when the 
application of the most appropriate method or methods produce a range of figures all of 
which are relatively equally reliable”74 
As we can deduct from the above statement, transfer pricing is not made of a single rule 
which brings only a specific result. We saw that there are multiples models and techniques 
that can be used in order to derive the correct transfer price in compliance with the arm’s 
length principle. When a strategy is established there are numerous of internal and external 
factors to take into consideration and, at a first glance, it may seem dissuasive. At one hand, 
the strategy will be aligned with internal goals and, at the other one, with external factors such 
as duty tariffs, competition and legal compliance. Enterprises have to ask themselves what 
they  want to achieve with their transfer pricing strategy. The answer can vary between 
regulatory compliance to tax optimization or competitiveness. When the aim is set there are 
other internal and external factors to take into consideration. The internal ones can also vary 
widely between enterprises while the external have a more unified appearance. Results may 
defer in relation to the model selected, and still the transfer price might be correct. It remains 
important that companies develop their own manual on transfer pricing, that they select the 
method that they are willing to use and that they communicate this method to the authorities. 
In such way, companies are more transparent and they are capable of showing how they are 
not using transfer pricing as a vehicle to shift profits from a country to another. It still remains 
hard because when there aren’t transactions that are comparable to other ones, or when the 
transaction is referred to intangible assets, the price chosen for the transaction might be 
difficult to assess. For example, if we are transferring the use of a license, or a trademark, the 
transfer price could be 100€ or could be 100’000 €. It then depends on the correct analysis of 
the underlying good or service that is being transferred and future earnings that might derive 
from it. Therefore, transfer pricing could be very challenging when comparable transaction do 
not exist, both for who sets the price and for who controls that the price set is correct. OECD 
guidelines have given multiple choices and many countries are following them in order to be 
on the same level, and in order to facilitate international transfer between multinationals. 
There have been enormous efforts in order to rule transfer pricing and the result reached in 
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this moment is quite satisfying but not optimal, because the multiple choice rules and methods 
increase the ambiguity of the system. In my opinion, transfer pricing rules should only focus 
on a singular method or on multiple ones that give the same output price independently from 
what methods are used, even though this remain very difficult because of the numerous types 
of transactions available in the market. To conclude, transfer pricing has to take into account a 
variety of variables that have to be analyzed in accordance with companies aims in order to 
select the correct model and the correct transfer pricing strategy. 
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